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Abstract 
 
My thesis is that secularization transforms religion into religiosity. In other words, 
the secular breaks apart religion, or rather, ‘deculturates’ religion from a cohesive, 
collective body embedded within a particular society and within a traditional culture 
towards an individuated, and existential experience of faith within the autonomous 
religious subject. There are various reasons for this shift, as there are various 
consequences. Globalization, which is modernization writ large, is the dominant 
paradigm through which I conceptualize these changes. The theorist whose work I use as 
a lens to interpret secularization, religion and societal transformation is Olivier Roy. 
Roy’s theories are of significance within the contemporary debates of globalization, the 
post-secular, and what is known as the ‘return of religion’, in that his theories provide a 
strong explanatory effect of the conditions of contemporary religion and societal change. 
Roy stands in the tradition of secularization theory that supports transition towards 
religious decline. He does not advocate the model of a revival of religion within the 
West. For Roy, secularization stands triumphant. My work supports his argument, thus I 
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My thesis is that secularization transforms religion into religiosity. In other words, the 
secular breaks apart religion, or rather, ‘deculturates’ religion from a cohesive, collective 
body embedded within a particular society and within a traditional culture towards an 
individuated, and existential experience of faith within the autonomous religious subject. 
There are various reasons for this shift, as there are various consequences. Globalization, 
which is modernization writ large, is the dominant paradigm through which I 
conceptualize these changes. The theorist whose work I use as a lens to interpret 
secularization, religion and societal transformation is Olivier Roy. Roy’s theories are of 
significance within the contemporary debates of globalization, the post-secular, and what 
is known as the “return of religion”, in that his theories provide a strong explanatory 
effect of the conditions of contemporary religion and societal change. Roy stands in the 
tradition of secularization theory that supports transition towards religious decline. He 
does not advocate the model of a revival of religion within the West. For Roy, 
secularization stands triumphant. My work supports his argument, thus I too advocate the 
secularization model, albeit with certain modifications.  
In particular, I use Roy’s work of Holy Ignorance, which is a comparative 
sociology of religion in conjunction with political science. The seminal and core theory 
of Olivier Roy’s Holy Ignorance is that religion and culture have parted ways because of
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globalization and secularization. There is now no longer an organic, embedded, and 
traditional link between a specific religion located within its specific culture. This split  
between culture and religion is what Roy calls “deculturation”. Religion is disembedded, 
and is thereby made abstract and virtual. The abstraction and virtualization of religion is 
subject to variation through the dissemination of information within the technology of the 
Internet and social media, and is thereby universalized.  
Why the term Holy Ignorance? What does Roy mean by Holy Ignorance? Holy 
Ignorance indicates religious fundamentalism’s ignorance of its own cultural and 
theological traditions, and it also indicates the secular west ignorance of its own cultural 
religious heritage. Roy’ use of the term ‘ignorance’ does not intend polemical insult, but 
rather Roy means ignorance in its most literal sense, that of the lack of knowledge. 
Knowledge of theological tradition is no longer required for the salvation for the religious 
believer, and knowledge of the religious heritage of Europe by the secular societies has 
largely been forgotten, in what French sociologist Danielle Hervieu-Leger calls 
“amnesiac societies”, which is the loss of the cultural memory of Europe through the 
process of secularization. Holy Ignorance is therefore the ignorance on both sides of the 
divide, that is, the ignorance that proceeds from the religious, and the ignorance that 
proceeds from the secular.  
In Chapter One, I lay out the connections between religion and globalization, and 
between secularization and Roy’s theory of deculturation. My observation is that 
globalization created the condition of the so-called return of religion, but at the same time 
it secularized religion into religiosity, thereby transforming and re-configuring the nature 
and role of religion within the public square into an embattled minority that takes on a 
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modernized, fundamentalist interpretation of the sacred. In this sense, globalization is 
both secularization and sacralization. However, secular culture impacts religion more so 
than the other way around. The unintended consequence of secularization is that by 
creating an autonomous sphere for religion, a road was paved for the 21st century 
resurgence and revitalization of religion. But this revitalization is only apparent, for it is 
the shifting tectonic plates of secularization that is driving the apparent phenomena of the 
religious resurgence. In Chapter Two, I support the theory that globalization secularizes 
and thereby deculturates religion into religiosity with the discussion of religious 
demography. Demographically, it is projected that the religious are set to out-birth the 
non-religious at such a prodigious rate that there may occur a reversal of secularization 
within the United States and Europe around 2050. This is because religiosity and fertility 
are directly correlated. Higher religiosity equals higher fertility, while lower religiosity 
equals lower fertility. And it is values that stand above socioeconomics when it comes to 
determining the rate of fertility. This is what Second Demographic Transition Theory 
maintains, that there was an ideational shift from a concern for the collective well being 
of the family towards a concern for the atomistic well being of the individual. The locus 
of the individual in conjunction with modernized reproductive technologies created a 
unique turning point within the history of human populations. Demographers Wolfgang 
Lutz, Vegard Skirbekk and Maria R. Testa lays out the problem clearly:  
…through the introduction of modern contraception, the evolutionary link 
between the drive for sex and procreation has been broken and now reproduction 
is merely a function of individual preferences and culturally determined norms.1  
                                                        
1 Wolfgang Lutz, Vegard Skirbekk and Maria Rita Testa, The Low Fertility Trap 





Individualization is the mechanism at work within the fertility rates of both the secular 
cohorts and the religious cohorts, and it is individualization that is itself a proxy for 
secularization, as it corresponds directly with human development and education, which 
are standard predictors for secularization. Secularization re-configures the fertility rates 
of the religious and non-religious, but the fecundity of the religious is also a sign of 
deculturation. The religious feel embattled within a hostile, secular majority, and thereby 
they reproduce to win the culture war, or what is also known as what political scientist 
Monica Duffy Toft calls “wombfare”. Furthermore, the likelihood of the children of the 
religious to retain the faith is, I suggest, unlikely. This is because deculturated religion 
consists of the religiosity of born-again faith, and such a fervent faith cannot be passed 
down to the children. Each individual must make a decision of faith on his or her own, a 
decision that consists of the classic conversion experience as espoused by Harvard 
psychologist William James, and as exemplified by the classic stories of conversion such 
as St. Paul the Apostle or the French philosopher Blaise Pascal. Therefore, Olivier Roy 
finds contemporary religious conversions and de-conversions to be of high significance 
in the decades to come, since they epitomize deculturated religion. In Chapter 3, because 
of the importance of conversions in discussing religion, secularization and deculturation, 
I examine religious conversions through demographic measures. Religious dis-affiliation, 
those who convert out of religion, is a measure of secularization. At the International 
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Austria, I ran demographic historical snapshots 
and demographic projections of the unaffiliated. I correlated human development and 
secondary education with secularization, and the demographic projections show further 
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secularization unto 2050 within North America and Europe. I argue that the globalized 
condition of the secular west creates an atmospheric ecology of religious dis-affiliation. 
Pluralism and pluralization only serves to secularize. Increasing economic affluence, 
legal protections for religious freedom and conversions, the myriad choices of religious 
optionality, increasing levels of human development and education, and the globalized 
mediascape that propagates secular values all work together in tandem to create a strong 
tendency towards secularization and religious dis-affiliation. The religious will likely 
further deculturate and radicalize in response. This will create further tension within the 
public square of the West. This tension thus leads to the post-secular debate. In Chapter 
4, I argue that the post-secular is a state of permanent tension, rather than mutual 
accommodation or translation. This is because deculturation is the breaking apart of 
nominal religion. The religious aim to be more pure, exclusive, and strive towards stricter 
ethical norms, with no compromise. The nominal, the liberal, and the secular are forced 
out from religious communities because of their aim for pure religion. On the other hand, 
the secular cohorts return the favor of exclusion towards the religious communities. 
Secularization aims to extirpate religious reference from the public square, and interprets 
religious practice and reference to transcendent norms as irrational and exotic. We are 
witnessing incommensurability between the secular and the religious more so than 
accommodation, and this is occurring at the locus of anthropology. For example, Olivier 
Roy points out that “the deep conflict that is dividing Europe between a secular majority 
and hardcore religious faith communities on abortion, same-sex marriage, bio-ethics, or 
gender issues shows that there is no longer a common moral ground for values.”2 This 
                                                        
2 Olivier Roy, Rethinking the Place of Religion in European Secularized Societies: the 
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explains why Pope John Paul II’s Theology of the Body is a major work of significance 
within both conservative and reactionary Roman Catholic circles, for they believe that an 
emerging rivalry of a sacred, metaphysical anthropology versus a secular, scientific 
anthropology is the final watershed moment within Western culture. With the split 
between religion and culture, there is no longer a continuity of common values between 
Christianity and modern Western secularized societies. In this sense, secularism has won, 
at least within the West. In the final Chapter 5, I bring the discussion to the discourse of 
political theology, which I believe is a natural concomitant to post-secularity, 
globalization and secularization. Roy’s Holy Ignorance and Globalized Islam have 
various implications that touch upon the subject. Carl Schmitt famously remarked that, 
“all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts.”3 Schmitt’s statement has since served as the definitive interpretation of what is 
political theology. Olivier Roy wrote in his Secularism Confronts Islam “that 
secularization does not mean the end of transcendence but the establishment of a 
nontheological transcendence, in a sense of a secularized religion.”4 It is at the interface 
of these two statements that I find there to be possible implications of political theology 
within Roy’s work. Secularism operates as a religion. The modern-nation state has taken 
on infinite value. The incommensurable anthropologies of a metaphysical sacred or a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
need for more open societies, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre, 
ReligioWest 2016. http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/40305 
 
3 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. 
George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 36. 
 
4 Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, trans. George Holoch (New York: Columbia 




scientific secular has touched upon the highest values of the religious and secular cohorts. 
Politics and religion, and the secular and the sacred, are in the final analysis unable to be 
completely separated, however, they are also at the same time unable to be completely 
conflated. There is a state of permanent tension between the two. Because of 
deterritorialisation and deculturation, the religious are linking along the lines of shared 
values and shared faith rather than society, territory and culture. This suggests that there 
is within cosmopolitan theory in conjunction with globalization that a possible avenue is 
able to emerge within political theology as a future narrative of our shared, global future. 
















Chapter One: Globalization and the Return of Religion 
The question of globalized religion in the 21st century begins with what is called “the 
return” or “the resurgence” of religion that began during the mid 20th century. Use of the 
term “return” or “resurgence”, as can be found in various theorists beginning with 
Jacques Derrida in the early 1990s, derives from the observation that a political and 
cultural presence of the religious has made a visible, significant impression upon the 
social realities of the secularized public spheres of Western democratic nation-states. In 
the last four decades we have witnessed global resurgence in every major world religion, 
bringing about a dramatic increase in the relative power and influence of religion within 
the dominant political structures and global civil society. The discursive reality of 
religion has obtained a wide scale of influence that extends beyond domestic concerns 
and into the greater international political dimensions of the global public square. At the 
center of this burgeoning of religion within our contemporary secular age is the theory of 
globalization as it relates to religion.  
There are three general observations that I want to make in this chapter. 
1) The first is that globalization theory best describes the dominant trends for our 
emerging religious future, the new forms of contemporary religions and religiosities, their 
future trajectories, their global trends, and their varieties of transformation within the 
Western public sphere. 2) The second observation is that globalization has created the 
conditions necessary for the so-called return of religion, and thereby the necessary 
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concomitant nature of the post-secular debate. The unintended consequence of 
secularization is that by creating an autonomous sphere for religion, a road was paved for 
the 21st century resurgence and revitalization of religion. 3) The third observation is the 
seemingly contradictory proposition that, as Olivier Roy makes clear, there is actually no 
return of religion, for globalization has separated religion from culture. The separation 
between religion and culture is what Olivier Roy calls “deculturated” religion, and it is 
deculturated religion that is “deterritorialised” that is at the root of both fundamentalist 
and liberalized religion. Olivier Roy rejects Samuel Huntington’s model of the “clash of 
civilizations” as an incorrect approach towards the relation between religion and society 
for the 21st century, because it assumes that religion and culture are necessarily linked, 
and that religion and culture are mutually embedded within each other. Religion and 
culture have since parted ways with emergence of globalization. 
Defining Religion 
“Religion” is a contested concept. It is by now methodological dogma within the field of 
religious studies to state that scholars of religion cannot come to a broad consensus as to 
who or what defines the concept of “religion”. In 1962, religious studies scholar Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith was the first to reject an essentialized, reified conceptual definition of 
religion within his seminal work The Meaning and End of Religion.5 During the 1980’s 
Jonathan Z Smith famously said in his Imagining Religion that “…there is no data for 
religion. Religion is solely the creation of the scholars study…Religion has no 
                                                        





independent existence apart from the academy”.6  By the 1990’s, anthropologist Talal 
Asad wrote in his Genealogies of Religion that “there can be no universal definition of 
religion, not only because its constitutional elements and relationships are historically 
specific, but because the definition itself is the historical product of discursive 
processes.”7 Within this past decade, Catholic theologian William Cavanaugh observed in 
his The Myth of Religious Violence that,  
there is no transhistorical or transcultural concept of religion essentially separate 
from politics. Religion has a history, and what counts as religion and what does 
not in any given context depends upon different configurations and authority.8  
 
And as of late, the critiques of the Western conceptualization of what constitutes 
“religion” have led to the current field of “Critical Religion” led by scholars such 
Timothy Fitzgerald and Russell McCutcheon. This new field maintains, according to 
Fitzgerald, that the category of religion is “not a stand alone concept”9, and should be 
demystified in favor of being empirically translated into terms that fundamentally denote 
cultural and social practices, and contextualized within the larger structures of ideology. 
The scholars of the ‘Critical Religion’ field adopt a materialist perspective that negates 
and criticizes any theologizing towards or phenomenology regarding the practice and 
concept of “religion”.  Their position is fundamentally the rejection of Mircea Eliade, 
                                                        
6 Jonathan Z Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), xi. 
 
7 Steve Bruce. “Defining Religion: A Practical Response.” International Review of 
Sociology 21, no. 1 (2011): 107-20. 
 
8 William Cavanaugh.  The Myth of Religious Violence.  (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. 58. 
 




whose religious theory of phenomenology and the sacred has been regarded as an 
essentially covert theology. The field of “Critical Religion” offers constructivist accounts 
of religion whereby religion is not some natural thing or entity out there waiting to be 
analyzed, nor is it an irreducible existential experience of the hierophanies of the sacred. 
Rather, “religion” is imagined and constructed as a veneer for the purposes of the 
organization and the structuralization of secular political-social phenomenon.  
Yet another way to frame the issue of defining religion is to recognize upfront that 
the concepts of the “religion” and the “secular” are both concomitants of each other, and 
both mutually constitute each other.  The concepts of the religious and the secular are not 
so easily pulled apart for the purpose of compartmentalization. There is hidden behind the 
characteristics of the secular a religious dimension, just as there is distributed throughout 
the domain of the religious a thoroughgoing secularization. Religion structures the 
secular, just as the secular structures religion. As Talal Asad observes,  
Religion has been part of the restructuration of practical times and spaces, a  
re-articulation of practical knowledge and powers, of subjective behaviors, 
sensibilities, needs and expectations in modernity. But that applies equally to 
secularism, whose function has been to try to guide that re-articulation and to 
define ‘religions’ in the plural as a species of (non-rational) belief.10  
 
Religion is absorbed into the practical order of politics and rationality, while the practical 
order of politics is drawn into the sacral order of religion and faith. Religion becomes 
politicized, and as Olivier Roy points out, this is what constituted the failed project of 
political Islam in the Middle East, as he argued in his book The Failure of Political 
                                                        
10 Talal Asad. “Reading a Modern Classic: Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s The ‘Meaning and 




Islam.11 For Olivier Roy, the political is inherently secular, and thereby any attempt of a 
religion to merge with the political order will inevitably secularize it.  
On the other hand, when the political encompasses the total, politics thereby 
become sacralized. Politics are the new religion, replete with their own kinds of faith, 
myths and utopian projects.12 Further, the political domain often operates as a theo-
political magisterium, defining what counts as religion within the secular Western courts 
of legislature with regards toward the legal concept of “religious freedom”, which is due 
to the fact of the multiplicity of definitions of religion inherent within the various 
religious communities.13  
Therefore, since the “secular” and the “religious” are an interrelated dyadic 
concept mutually negotiating each other in their meaning and significance, it can 
therefore be said that the definition of “religion” as we know it within the West will 
always be a modern concept, as it is always tied to the “secular” as an Enlightenment 
project that undergirds the modern Western nation-state. As such, there is always and 
already a mutual inter-construction and inter-play between the concepts of religion, 
religious, and religiosity on one hand, and on secularism, the secular, and secularity on 
the other.  
                                                        
11 Olivier Roy.  The Failure of Political Islam.  (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1994). 
 
12 See Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); 
and John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (Farrar, 
Strauss and Giroux, 2008). 
 
13 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, (Princeton: 




To define religion, I concur with William Cavanaugh’s broader observation about 
the debate of what defines the concept of religion:  
Some scholars have cited James Leuba’s Psychological Study of Religion  
(1912), which lists more than fifty different definitions of religion, to conclude 
that there is no way to define religion. But as Jonathan Z Smith points out, the 
lesson is not that religion cannot be defined, but that it can be defined in more 
than fifty different ways.14  
 
Because religions and the religious can be variously conceptualized in myriad ways, the 
real issue for the question of religion and globalization is in what sense do these 
conceptualizations and theories of religion offer as the better or best explanatory effect of 
religion and the religious in contemporary Western society? Following philosopher 
Thomas Kuhn, my assumption in theorizing contemporary religion is that “to be accepted 
as a paradigm a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact 
never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.”15 The map is never the 
territory. Though the map may accurately signify, the map is never the actual territory 
that is to be experienced, and there will always be facts in tension with the map.  
I therefore offer two broad designations of the definition of religion upfront, one 
of pragmatic use, and the other of demographic use. For the first pragmatic sense, I offer 
sociologist of religion Steve Bruce’s definition that religion 
consists of actions, beliefs and institutions predicated upon the assumption of the 
existence of either supernatural entities with powers of agency, or impersonal 
                                                        
14 William Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence,  (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
119. 
 





powers or processes possessed of moral purpose, which have the capacity to set 
the conditions of, or to intervene in, human affairs.16 
 
 Charles Taylor also uses this definition of religion by Steve Bruce for his analysis of 
secularization in his famous work A Secular Age. Since this dissertation limits itself only 
to Christianity, Islam and the Secular within the West, this definition of religion is 
effective enough for its purpose to denote a firsthand observation of the characteristic of 
the Western religion in which I am dealing with. It is a coherent interpretation of the 
three religious cohorts. 
 The second is the demographic sense, which I offer in tandem with demographers 
Brian Grim and Todd Johnson their definition of religion, which is  
an organized group of committed individuals that adhere to and propagate a 
specific interpretation of explanations of existence based on supernatural 
assumptions through statements about the nature and workings of the supernatural 
and about ultimate meaning.17  
 
The demographic model is used to denote any sort of statistical reference when it come to 
the measurement of religious bodies as it pertains to immigration within the USA and 
Western Europe, and as a measurement of secularization and religiosity. It is within this 
demographic sense that we can locate what is called the Secular cohort, the unaffiliated 
or the ‘Nones’, which stands a measure for secularization.  
For the third definition of religion I reject an essentialization or a taxonomic 
classification of religion, preferring rather ‘the religious’ or ‘religiosity’, which makes the 
                                                        
16 Charles Taylor,  A Secular Age,  (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 429. 
   
17 Brian Grim and Todd Johnson, The World’s Religions in Figures: An Introduction to 




experience and beliefs of the subject the locus of analysis. Religiosity, as defined Roy, 
consists of “faith as it is lived: the manner in which believers experience their 
relationship with religion, it is the lived, inner experience, religious feeling, but also the 
way believers define themselves in the outside world…”18 We can provide a 
conceptualized backdrop to ground the switch from religion towards religiosity with 
continental philosopher of religion Carl Raschke’s definition of religion in his work 
Postmodernism and the Revolution in Religious Theory. Raschke writes that  
We, therefore, deliberately seek to avoid any routine resort to the generic term 
‘religion’, which suggests a generic assemblage, an ‘essentiality’. We prefer the 
adjectival substantive ‘the religious’ to remind us of the ‘horizon-tal’ character of 
what we are theorizing.19 
 
To speak of the ‘the religious’ is to speak of those practices and people who are always 
encroaching upon the religious singularity of what Raschke designates as the event 
horizon. 
Globalization and its relation to Deculturation and Deterritorialisation 
Raschke speaks in his GloboChrist of “globalization as religionization”20 and within his 
Postmodernism and the Revolution in Religious Theory that  “the globalization of the 
world proceeds in tandem with its religionization.”21 Globalization, which is modernity 
writ large, is the paradigm through which the future trajectories of the religious are best 
                                                        
18 Olivier Roy, Holy Ignorance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 15. 
 
19 Carl Raschke, Postmodernism and the Revolution in Religious Theory: Towards a 
Semiotics of the Event, (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2012). 
 
20 Carl Raschke,  GloboChrist: The Great Commission Takes a Postmodern Turn, (Baker 
Academic, 2008). 
 
21 Carl Raschke,  Postmodernism and the Revolution in Religious Theory, (Virginia, 
University of Virginia Press, 2012), 7. 
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interpreted. Globalization is the universal paradox of the sacred and secular, for inasmuch 
as globalization secularizes religion, at the same time it sacralizes the secular.  
When entering, furthermore, into the subject of globalization and religion, we are 
also observing and analyzing the function of signs that are de-territorialized through the 
process of globalized technology and human communication between the religious and 
among the religious and the non-religious. The signifiers of religious symbolic that flow 
through exchanges within the virtual global sphere within the Internet are embraced and 
adapted by individuals, subject to their own sense of interpretation. Internet memes win 
converts and create born-again religiosities, and serve to undermine all institutional forms 
of authoritative restrictions. Memes create political-religious events, and political-
religious events create memes. Globalized religion expands through the global 
marketplace of signifiers, enabled with globalized communication technologies and 
conditioned through the secularized space of Western democratic societies. 
This “internetization” of communication runs in conjunction with the 
anthropological dimension of the religious. As Raschke observes:  
Religion is not a ‘form’ or ‘cultural formation’; it is neither an ‘essence’ nor a 
generic characteristic of phenomena. It is a singularity in around which the signs 
of language and culture, which include the semiotic markets of theological 
discourse, as well as the events that constitute our historicity, swarm and 
circulate.22  
 
It is at this location of the ‘semiotic market’ in which signifiers ‘swarm and circulate’ 
where I find a direct connection to Olivier Roy’s theories of globalization and religion 
within Holy Ignorance, as Roy writes that, “what we are witnessing today is the militant 
                                                        
22 Ibid., 7. 
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reformulation of religion in a secularized space that has given religion its autonomy and 
therefore the conditions for its expansion.”23   
Globalization leads us to the question of “deculturation”. What is “deculturation”? 
Deculturation is the central idea of Holy Ignorance, in that religion and culture have 
parted ways, and that there is no longer an automatic link between religion and culture. 
Olivier Roy conceptually defines the split and severance between religion and culture as 
deculturation. Deculturation as a concept was not invented by Roy, but was a neologism 
created by anthropologist Daniel P. Kunene in 1968, who defined deculturation as  
the process, whereby, at the meeting of two cultures, one consciously and  
deliberately dominates the other, and denies it the right to exist, by both indirectly 
and indirectly, a) questioning its validity as a culture b) denigrating it c) making 
its carriers objects of ridicule and scorn, and thus d) finally leading to the 
questioning thereof by the very people whom it has nurtured and given an identity 
and a positive being.24 
 
Roy, however, takes his conception of deculturation into a different direction, one that is 
not so much post-colonial, but is rather descriptive in its usage. Deculturation, for Roy, is 
a matter for of globalization theory, and not necessarily post-colonial. 
Roy defines deculturation in Holy Ignorance as “the loss or abandonment of 
culture or cultural characteristics”, that namely it is a loss of the cultural characteristics of 
religion primarily within the West, though it has global implications. Roy’s theory of 
deculturation in a nutshell is that “secularization and globalization have forced religions 
to break away from culture, to think of themselves as autonomous and to reconstruct 
themselves in a space that is no longer territorial and is therefore no longer subject to 
                                                        
23 Olivier Roy, Holy Ignorance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2.  
 
24 Daniel P. Kunene. “Realism and Romanticism in African Literature.”  Africa Today.  
Vol. 15, No.4  (Aug- Sep, 1968), pp. 19-24. 
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politics.”25 To deculturate is for a religion to be stripped of its culture and territory in 
which it has been traditionally embedded. Once religion is untethered from culture, and 
made autonomous, the religion becomes exportable and universalizable, and able to be 
adapted through generalized interpretation.  
There are various consequences of this shattered link between religion and 
culture. The first is that, according to Roy, “deculturation is the loss of the social 
expression of religion”, which thereby obliterates the nominal community identity that 
once held ethnicity, culture and society together. As Roy points out, for the traditional 
model of religion and culture, “religious allegiance is not considered to be a question of 
personal choice; it is a community identity and individual belief does not come into it.”26 
There is a co-incidence between the religious marker and the cultural marker, whereby 
belonging takes precedence over believing. For example, the common sense and 
everyday observation that Italians are Catholic, Serbians are Orthodox, the Tibetans are 
Buddhist, the Turkish are Muslim is increasingly becoming no longer the case due to 
deculturating process inherit within globalization. Protestantism, secularization and other 
forms of new spiritualities are growing within each of the societies of these nation-states, 
challenging perceptions of ethno-nationalism and the religious traditions that were once 
inherit to them.  
Through deculturation, religion is shifting away from its civilizational aspect 
towards more fundamentalist or liberalized varieties. As Roy writes, contemporary 
religion consists of the fact that  
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we are witnessing a shift of the traditional forms of religious practice— 
Catholicism, Hanafi Islam, classic Protestant denominations such as Anglicanism 
and Methodism—towards more fundamentalist and charismatic forms of 
religiosity (evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, Salafism, Tablighi Jamaat, neo-
Sufism, Lubavich).27  
 
What is thriving are new recent inventions of religion that began roughly in the 18th 
century, such as Wahhabism, Salafism, Hasidim, the evangelical awakenings of the 
Wesleys, and of Pentecostalism. These new kinds of religious practice are more readily 
and easily exportable than either their traditional or mainline counterparts. Deculturated 
religion separates itself from culture and universalizes itself through the expansion of 
evangelism, proselytization and individual conversion. Conversion is no longer a mass 
phenomenon but an individual phenomenon.  
This universalizing form of deculturated religion, which is no longer nominal, 
now consists of the choice of voluntary individuals who link together in communities that 
are situated outside of national politics and political territories because of the separation 
between religion and state, and at the same time they push back against what they 
perceive as a surrounding hostile secular culture. Both the state and the culture are 
rejected as hostile towards its practice and beliefs. We therefore do not have clash of 
civilizations, which is a model based on the embedding of religion within culture, but 
rather a clash of competing emerging religiosities. Religion is no longer civilizational and 
cultural, but rather is globalized and individualized. 
For Roy, deculturation operates in conjunction with “deterritorialisation” . 
Deterritorialisation finds its conceptual trace not with Olivier Roy, but rather with 
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Delueze and Guattari’s critique of capitalism in their A Thousand Plateaus.28 Roy adapts 
deterritorialisation within Holy Ignorance for his own specific use. Roy states that,  
Religion and culture no longer have a relationship with a territory or given 
society, which is what we call deterritorialisation. It means that religion has to 
define itself solely in terms of religion: there is no longer any social authority or 
social pressure to conform.29   
 
Religion is no longer inherently embedded or linked to a political society or territorial 
space; and because of such, one of the outcomes is that the social authority of who or 
what defines religion has been jettisoned.  Without a centralizing social authority, this 
opens Pandora’s box of the indeterminacy of religious identities that can evolve towards 
fundamentalists or liberalized forms of interpretation.  
Roy also uses “deterritorialisation” in another sense to refer to a “general 
phenomenon”30 that blurs distinctions and borders between what is considered 
“Christianity” or “Islam” and what is considered the “West” on the ideological and 
territorial level. The blurring of lines between borders and identities, that of 
hybridization, is the outcome of deterritorialisation. Roy connects deterritorialisation to 
social demographic factors as well, because of the migration of a significant proportion of 
Muslim populations into Western European societies that picked up steam since the 
1970’s, with France and Germany taking the largest bulk. 31 Roy also connects 
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deterritorialisation with ideology, since the spread of Muslim religious minorities runs in 
conjunction with the spread of religious ideas across the entire theo-political spectrum. 
As Roy writes,  
There is definitely a link between the growing deterritorialisation of Islam  
(namely the growing number of Muslims living in Western non-Muslim 
countries) and the spread of specific forms of religiosity, from radical 
neofundamentalism to a renewal of spirituality or an insistence on Islam as a 
system of values and ethics.32 
 
Deterritorialisation is thereby hinged to the wheel of modernization that turns both ways 
in either theo-political direction, either towards liberalization or towards fundamentalism.  
Deterritorialisation also constructs within the media the central categories and 
themes that contain the public debates regarding Islam and the West, such as 
“multiculturalism, minority groups, clash or dialogue of civilizations, 
communautarisation.”33  Roy points out that “ethnicity and religion are being marshaled 
to draw new borders between groups whose identity relies on a performative definition: 
we are what we say we are, or what others say we are.”34 It is precisely at this function of 
self-identity, of saying that ‘we are what we say we are’, that makes deculturated religion 
a complicated issue within the public debate between religion and the secular. When one 
obtains the right to self-identify as the religious identity that one desires, this creates a 
profusion of religious identities that cannot necessarily be refuted through a collective 
social authority. One sees this in the debate on ISIS, with Muslims debating over who has 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
32 Ibid, 2. 
 
33 Ibid, 20. 
 




the right to be called a Muslim or not, or whether a new religious movement is Islamic or 
not. Is ISIS ‘Islamic’?35 Are those who join ISIS ‘Muslim’? In the final analysis, those 
who participate in ISIS can justifiably call themselves Muslim and their movement 
Islamic based on the criteria of self-identification, which is itself a criteria that is 
legitimized and globalized through the Westernization of values, secular norms and legal 
rights. Roy points out that, for Muslims in the West, “the aim is to reconstruct a true 
Muslim community by starting from the individual. It is based on an individual re-
appropriation of Islamic symbols, arguments, rhetoric and norms.”36  Because 
individuation is at the core of the transformation of the religious, the secular domain 
takes precedence when explaining the transformation of the religious, rather than their 
sacred texts or theological beliefs. To understand contemporary movements within Islam, 
it is more appropriate to start with the deculturation process inherit within secularization, 
rather than what the Koran says or what Muslims have traditionally believed. Traditional 
theological interpretations of the sacred text are fundamentally challenged with the 
globalization of secularized, liquid modernity. 
Deterritorialisation thereby works against definitions of religious identity that are 
established through collective means of institutional social authority. Olivier Roy writes 
that the “deterritorialisation of Islam leads to the quest for definition, because Islam is no 
                                                        








longer embedded in territorial cultures…”37 The matter of defining of what consists of 
Islam is not only an issue of institutions, since institutions desire to consolidate a defined 
liberalized and democratic Islam in the face of the terrorism of radical Islam, but also 
from the every day Muslims themselves who face secularization and hostility from both 
the far left and the far right. Muslims have to reconstruct the definition of what it means 
to be Muslim and what Islam as a religion means because of the cultural challenges of 
secularization and secularism. As Roy writes,  
Deterritorialisation also has an impact on the production of the Muslim discourse.  
First, resettled or uprooted Muslims are more prone to reassess what Islam means 
for them, either to reconstruct a Muslim identity or to answer questions (and 
pressures) from the non-Muslim environment.38 
 
This adaptation, reappropriation and reconstruction of religious identity can take 
shape through fundamentalist interpretations, but also liberalized interpretations as well. 
For instance, Roy points out that in the reconstruction of the identity of Islam, there is 
also developing “an uprooted, deterritorialised and cosmopolitan intelligentsia, sharing a 
common language (English or, less often, modern literary Arabic), [that] plays a role in 
producing values, teachings and world views adapted to globalization.” 39 In this sense, 
both cosmopolitan values and counter-cosmopolitan interpretations of Islam are 
deterritorialised through the globalization.  
Deterritorialisation can also be linked with post-Christendom Christianity, where 
global Pentecostal faith is spreading, the free churches of non-denominational 
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Christianity, and with the breaking apart of mainline institutions of Christianity due to the 
conservative and liberal divide on theological anthropological norms. In the backdrop of 
a secularized and post-Christian Europe, and in conjunction with deterritorialised Muslim 
minorities, the debate of the post-secular has emerged to account for the sociological 
conditions. 
Finally, Roy defines detteriorialisation as not only demographic, but also as 
symbolic, as that which spreads information.  
Detteritorialisation is not only associated with the movement of people (which 
only affects a small percentage of the global population), but also with the 
circulation of ideas, cultural objects, information and modes of consumption 
generally in a non-territorial space. But in order to circulate, the religious object 
must appear universal, disconnected from a specific culture that has to be 
understood in order for the message to be grasped. Religion therefore circulates 
outside of knowledge. Salvation does not require people to know, but to believe.40  
 
The idea of Roy’s use of the term Holy Ignorance is that when a specific religion is 
separated from specific culture, the message of that religion is overly simplified. The 
adherents are unaware or are ignorant of the traditional body of theological beliefs and 
historical culture that is necessary to have a mature, knowledgeable understanding of that 
particular religion. One simply takes up the Bible and believes, or one joins ISIS without 
having read the Koran, or one becomes a kind of Buddhist that reflects Western pop 
psychology self-help practices more so than authentic Buddhist practices in Tibet. When 
religion and culture part ways, we have now designer spirituality, a create-your-own-
kind-of-religion that is swayed either by consumerism or secularization. The universal, 
absolute message of autonomous is communicated through the technology of the internet 
and social media within a globalized spiritual marketplace that creates an optionality of 
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religious choices, with individuals operating as consumers. The globalized spread of a 
deculturated, disembedded and decontextualized religion within the virtual sphere of 
cyberspace in conjunction with global mass migration is what creates the image of the 
return of religion. 
Why Globalization Secularizes 
It is by now evident that since 9/11 and the aftermath of the Iraq war and other various 
martial engagements within the Middle East, and since the rise of internet social media 
and the technology of the smart phone, and alongside the financial collapse of Wall Street 
in 2008 with its global implications, that we have established enough pervasive evidence 
to say that globalization stands and continues to develop as an integrating societal process 
that increasingly shapes global mutual interdependence within all spheres of human 
activity. 
The concept of globalization began and runs in tandem with the emerging global 
culture of free market capitalism. The coinage and use of ‘globalization’ was at first a 
concept developed by Harvard economist Theodore Levitt during the 1970’s. Levitt 
developed the idea of the “globalization of markets”, arguing that there was a 
“standardization” of products or forced commonality of markets that was developing 
through what Daniel Boorstin called “The Republic of Technology”, in which the 
“supreme law…is convergence, the tendency for everything to become more like 
everything else.”41 And it is technology that makes globalization the summit of 
modernization, for modernization according to the late sociologist Peter Berger “consists 
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of the growth and diffusion of a set of institutions rooted in the transformation of the 
economy by means of technology”.42  With technological advance, the world as a whole 
homogenizes and standardizes in all of its ensuing features contained within the societal, 
political and cultural sectors. And as of such, this includes the realm of religion and the 
religious. Globalization stands over and above secularization as the key indicator of 
religious transformation within contemporary society, as it encompasses the whole of 
which secularization consists of the part. Globalization is that which secularizes. 
Globalization is secularization. 
Secularization can be briefly defined within three senses that interlock. The first is 
that of Peter Berger, in which he defines it as “the process by which sectors of society 
and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols”43; the 
second is that of sociologist Bryan Wilson, who defines it as the “decline of the social 
significance of religion”44; and the third is that of sociologist Mark Chaves, who defines 
it as “the declining scope of religious authority”45. Taken as a whole, I use secularization 
within these three parameters: the extirpation of governing institutional religious symbols 
from all sectors within society, the decline of significance of religion within these sectors, 
and the loss of centralized religious authority. 
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Globalization secularizes because globalization is itself the outcome of the logic 
of modernity and late capitalism. And “modernization” as a concept has always been the 
core component to the classic secularization thesis. The secularization thesis is that the 
more a society modernizes, then the more the society will secularize, or simply put: more 
modernization equals less religion. The classic thesis of secularization has been disputed 
through what is known as the resurgence of religion, which raises various factors that 
suggest that the secularization thesis ought to be consigned to the dustbin of history.46 
Suffice to say now, Olivier Roy stands within the tradition of secularization theory, and 
argues that religion is in interminable decline within the West. For Roy, secularization 
stands triumphant.  
Globalization can be considered as a ‘package’ concept that contains within 
several variables that all converge and contribute to the production of secularization: 
democratization, neoliberalism, the “ecumenism of human rights”, advanced technology, 
mass immigration, and the spread of western values. All of these variables contained 
within the ‘package’ concept of globalization converge within an output known as the 
global spiritual marketplace, which refers “to the plurality and variety of religious offers 
in culture” in which “new ‘competitors’ enter the marketplace where the individual can 
choose from whatever offer caters best to his/her religious needs.”47 Levitt’s notion of the 
convergence of globalized markets has served as the basis for conceptualizing religious 
expression through economic forms within the supply-demand consumer model of a 
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globalized spiritual market place. This analysis of global spiritual marketplace concurs 
with Raschke, who writes that  
The global marketplace has made ‘culture’ a vast supermarket aisle of customized 
consumer items, a set of symbolic codes and accepted practices that eventuate 
from both competitive and often commercial efforts to ‘locate’ and domesticate a 
person or a group within the global emporium of ideologies and life options.48  
 
Religion has become one option among many, and the individual stands over and above 
the collective and tradition, enabled to choose among the options. This relation between 
the individual and the religious option at hand takes it paradigmatic symbol within the 
religious convert. The paradigm of the religious convert is one of Roy’s key notions in 
his Holy Ignorance. As Roy writes regarding his work, “Converts and the born-again are 
central to our study, since they epitomize the phenomenon of the deculturation of 
religion.”49  
Globalization also refers to the “compression of the world and intensification of 
consciousness of the world as a whole”, according to Roland Robertson.50 This 
compression of global consciousness is marked by the intensifying speed of rapid social 
transformations through ever increasing interdependence and interconnectivity by way of 
exponentially increasing communication technologies. Economist Ellen Frost defines 
globalization as a “long term process of connection and transformation” that “sets in 
motion a living, expanding and highly uneven network of cross-border flows” that pertain 
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to products, people and ideologies.51 The world has become a vast social network. 
Manuel Castells concluded in his trilogy The Information Age that, “the rise of the 
network society and the growing power of identity are the intertwined social processes 
that jointly define globalization, geopolitics, and social transformation in the early 
twentieth first century.”52  Manuel Castells observes that we are now in the “Age of 
Networks”, and as of such the religious are aligning, connecting and developing their 
sacred communities along this technological and electronic web of nodes and lines of 
communication—what can be called the internetization of the religious and religiosity. 
Olivier Roy shows in his Globalized Islam how Islamic religious communities through 
the virtual space of the Internet are creating a globalized ummah. In this sense, 
globalization both fragments and coheres, fragmenting social cohesion into identities of 
religiosity, and at the same time cohering identities of religiosity into communities that 
align alongside their own reconstructed values, norms and theological beliefs. We are 
therefore post-Durkheimian, insofar as religion no longer coheres collectively and is no 
longer organically embedded within society. 
Furthermore, shifting forms of human population run in conjunction with shifting 
forms of knowledge mediated through the globalized technology of social media, which 
adds up to a hyper-acceleration of societal transformation. Continental philosopher Paul 
Virilio explains this rapid, hyper-acceleration of societal change through his concept of 
dromology, which means the logic of speed. Speed “exerts a number of transformative 
                                                        
51 Raschke, GloboChrist, 27. 
 
52 Manuell Castells, The Power of Identity: The Information- Economy, Society and 




effects upon human culture” and is “the decisive factor in human technological 
evolution.”53 The logic and rate of speed in these technologies increases the rate and 
possibilities of the dissemination of information and the dissemination of people within 
immigration, shaping social realities and therefore religiosity faster than they are able to 
be inculturated within political territories. Dromology makes religious inculturation 
impossible, and at the same time enhances deculturation.  Both the ‘public space’ and the 
‘public sphere’ are reconstructed within the social imaginary as a globalized virtual space 
where traditional boundaries of space, time and borders are melted into amorphous and 
nebulous configurations. What this creates is a vast and uncontrollable rapid spread of 
ideas and information in which social networks emerge and respond in real time, thereby 
creating various global civil societies and transnational communities that are adapted by 
both the religious and secular alike.  
With the exponential increase of information circulated and immigration imported 
into Western societies, pluralization is now the political question of our global 
democratic age; globalization is pluralization. This ‘globalization’ of people and ideas 
circulates varieties of religious beliefs, practices and communities, and therefore 
increases religious diversity and plurality –such as seen in expressive religious 
individualism in the West – as well as a sense of transnational solidarity with religious 
communities, such as seen with the Islamic ummah and global civil society. Greater 
religiously diverse societies contain a cacophonous variety of religious bodies committed 
towards a position within a political spectrum consisting of liberal, moderate or 
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fundamentalist values. Forced to intersect side by side, these religious bodies and faith 
communities form competition and conflict within a global religious market. Because of 
such, Peter Berger has argued to replace the thesis that ‘modernization equals 
secularization’ with thesis that ‘modernization equals pluralization’. In other words, that 
the theory of secularization should be replaced with the theory of pluralization.54  
Although Berger is right in assessing the pluralizing condition of Western 
societies, as we shall soon see, pluralization itself is a condition and agent of 
secularization.  Pluralization increases the opportunity for disaffiliation.55 Pluralization 
relativizes through the spread of religious options, which thereby casts reflexive doubt 
within the subject as towards his/her religious convictions. Religious diversity does not 
stimulate greater religious participation, but rather secularization and disaffiliation. 
Globalization pluralizes, and pluralization secularizes. 
To compact matters further, pluralization has two meanings. The first is that 
within the collective level, through the measurement of the proliferation of religious 
bodies within societies. The second is that which operates within the individual level, 
through the multiplicities of identities. The cultural effect of hybridization allows for the 
porous and liminal identity of both/and, while pluralization also brings about the 
possibility for ‘multiple religious belonging’, ‘double belonging’, or ‘hyphenated 
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religious identity’.56 Therefore, hybridization of religious identity, due to the disjunctured 
and fractured process of globalization, challenges the traditional form of binary, 
taxonomic classification, and creates a radical, thoroughgoing pluralization on both the 
individual and the collective level.57 Pluralization of identity is unbounded. 
Furthermore, globalization as a societal process driven by technology runs 
together with globalism as the dominating symbolic imaginary and ideology of the West. 
Globalism in conjunction with globalization enhances secularization. Globalism resides 
in at least two spheres, the political and the economic. The political sphere consists of the 
modern project of pluralism that is maintained and advanced through democratization. 
These political conditions of liberal democracy and freedom of religion substantiates a 
religious atmosphere of pluralism. What sociologist of religion Daniel Hervieu Leger 
calls the “ecumenism of human rights” is cast within the political structures of the legal 
options for the freedom of religion.58 This universal standard is crystallized in the Article 
18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes the freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.59  
 
                                                        
56 Brian Grim and Todd Johnson, The World Religions in Figures: An Introduction to 
International Religious Demography. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). 
 
57 See Homi Babha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
 
58 Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington, Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in 






Article 19 and Article 20 also support religious freedom by proposing and supporting 
“freedom of opinion and expression” as well as “freedom of association”. This 
“ecumenism of human rights” formats or standardizes religion into the concept of the so-
called “world religions”, thereby putting these world religions inadvertently into an 
ontological, homogenized plane of sameness without difference. Religions are 
essentialized. Every religion is just as valid, is as the same, and is as equal as the other. 
The message conveyed is that all religions are one. The presumption of this this notion 
that all religions are one traces its origins to construction of the concept of religion with 
the advance of European colonialism, and was given a further modernized 
epistemological grounding with the philosopher John Hicks, whose model of religion 
consisted of the metaphor the singular mountain that has various paths.  
And within the economic realm, globalism also takes on the economic form of 
what Peter Berger terms “Davos culture”, which consists of Westernized human 
development wedded together with neoliberal capitalism that serves as the infrastructure 
of the global monetary basis.60 The output of the economic realm is the spread of post-
material values within post-industrial societies that engender a lifestyle of self-realization 
and expressive individualism. Globalism, running in conjunction with globalization, 
perpetually secularizes societies and creates the disjunction of deculturated religion. 
Therefore in our global, liberal democratic, pluralized, secular age, we are left with the 
over-arching societal condition whereby we have thriving religious bodies with 
competing theo-political norms set alongside and up against thriving non-religious bodies 
                                                        





with their own particular set of secular norms. The unintended consequence of 
secularization is that by creating an autonomous sphere for religion, a road was paved for 
the 21st century resurgence and revitalization of religion.  
Globalization is the condition of the Return of Religion 
The rise of the transnational influence of religion is due to the modernization within 
technologies of communication and media, as well as the various processes inherit within 
globalization, namely demography and democratization.61 Though these factors of hyper-
rate global communication and universal expansion of democratic values were first 
thought to pose critical challenges to the growth and social cohesion of the religious 
communities, the response of the religious to globalization was largely accommodating 
toward these processes and thus the religious effectively became assimilated, whether 
through their participation in global civil society as a force for peace within the 
‘ecumenism’ of human rights, or in the reaction of anti-globalism religious networks who 
paradoxically use modern communicative technologies as a countervailing platform and 
vehicle for terrorism and violence.  
Usual indications of the rise of the religion start with the observation of the rise of 
political Islam throughout the Middle East and North Africa, beginning with the 
significance of the rise of the Khomeni regime. In addition to the rise of political Islam, 
there is the world wide spread of evangelicalism through Protestant missionary 
movements, the mass migration of immigrants that have brought strong religious 
communities straight into the heart of secularized cosmopolitan cities of Western Europe, 
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the rise of the Moral Majority and the Christian Republican conservatism within the 
United States, the spread of cults (Jim Jones, David Koresh, Heavens Gate), the birth of 
New Age spiritualities, and New Religious Movements (Scientology, Jehovah’s Witness, 
Mormons) within Western Europe. What ties these movements all together is the 
secularizing force of globalization. 
We must also first recognize that the ‘the return of religion’ was a nomenclature 
coined by Jacques Derrida in his work Acts of Faith, a return that he linked with the rise 
of globalization, or as Derrida puts it, ‘globalatinization’. As Derrida explains,  
religion today allies itself with tele-technoscience, to which it reacts with all its 
forces. It is on the one hand, globalization; it produces, weds, exploits, the capital 
and knowledge of tele-mediaziation; neither the trips and global spectacularizing 
of the Pope, nor the interstate dimensions of the “Rushdie affair,” nor planetary 
terrorism would otherwise be possible, at this rhythm—and we could multiply 
such indications ad infinitum.62  
 
Derrida observes that ‘tele-technoscience’, by which he means the technology of 
communications and the mediascape, has created and globalized the visibility of religion 
to the public square. Derrida’s reference to Pope John Paul II—who was the world’s first 
rock-star celebrity Pope, and who had played a decisive political role in the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe—runs in agreement with Olivier Roy’s observation that 
“John Paul II’s papacy embodied religion’s media-friendly modernity.63  
At the same time, Derrida also posits the opposite of media-friendly religion, that 
of the ‘Rushdie affair’, whereby Iranian novelist Salman Rushdie had a fatwa issued 
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against him, calling for his assassination for his controversial novel The Satanic Verses. 
The fatwa was issued from the Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, which is often traced as the first transition towards globalized 
religious fundamentalism. What Derrida was picking up on was that the same dynamics 
at play within this “planetary terrorism” were similar to those at play within the “global 
spectacularizing” of conservative Catholic revivalism. Religion is either cast in a hostile 
or a friendly light, and emerges in processes that can favor democratization as we see 
with John Paul II, or religion can opposes democratization, as we see with Khomeni. And 
at the core of this is what Derrida calls “digital culture”, “digital systems and virtually 
immediate panoptical visualization, ‘air space’, telecommunications satellites, 
information highways, concentration of capitalistic-mediatic power” in which “the 
cyberspatialized or cyberspaced wars of religion have no stakes other than the 
determination of the ‘world’, of ‘history’, of the ‘day’, and of the ‘present’.”64 The 
globalizing technological advance of the secularizing digital culture is at the heart of the 
return of religion. 
Yet, as Raschke writes, “The ‘return’ of religion is actually a resurgence, a violent 
reaction to the relativizing, historicizing, and ‘liberating’ effects of modernity.”65 
Secularization, intent on pacifying religion, in turn created the reaction that it had 
intended to mitigate. Religion returned, or rather reacted, against the secularization which 
was itself the cause for the autonomous expansion of the religious. However, the kind of 
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religion that expressed itself was that of fundamentalism. The term “fundamentalism” 
emerged in the twentieth century United States referring to debates that took place within 
protestant denominations, in particular the Baptists and Presbyterians, over the modernist 
theology that was taking sway over them, with ‘the fundamentalists’ identifying 
themselves as the guardians of traditional orthodoxy. Overall, according to Martin Marty, 
“fundamentalism was a specific response to modern challenges; the word reaction best 
serves to describe the impulse and strategy of fundamentalists.”66 Fundamentalism is not 
confined to any one particular religion or faith, any nation-state or particular western 
society, and cuts across all markers of gender, race and class.  Fundamentalism as a 
modernist movement that uses a highly selective approach when it comes to translating 
the scriptures, without using interpretative apparatus of the complexities of tradition and 
culture.  As Martin Marty and Scott Appleby point out,  
The fact that fundamentalist movements’ middle management and rank and file 
frequently have educational and professional backgrounds in applied sciences, 
technical and bureaucratic fields helps explain why fundamentalists tend to read 
scriptures like engineering blueprints—as a prosaic set of instructions and 
specifications.67 
 
The interpretation of the scripture of the fundamentalist is “reduced to a storehouse of 
raw materials to be ransacked as needed for building a political program. Few poets or 
cosmologists find their way into fundamentalists cadres.”68 The text is abstracted, and is 
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able to be interpreted any way possible, falling into the hands of whomever wills through 
the passageway of technology and social media. Olivier Roy points out that 
“Fundamentalism is the religious form that is most suited to globalization, because it 
accepts its own deculturation and makes it the instrument of its claim to universality.”69 
The return of religion is better understood as the reaction of religion towards the 
globalizing force of secularization, and because of its reactionary nature, fundamentalism 
and globalization are joined at the hips. Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman argue that,  
it is entirely arguable that the rise of globalization discussions—which in their 
early social scientific and business forms began roughly, and with various 
antecedents, in the very early 1980’s—coincided with the rise to prominence of 
religious movements tagged ‘fundamentalisms’.70  
 
Fundamentalism is therefore a symptom and key indicator of the technological advance 
and secularizing force of globalization. Globalization creates fundamentalism. The 
rseturn of religion is therefore simply the reaction of religion. 
Conclusion: There is no Return of Religon 
In sum, globalization produces secularization, which deculturates religion. Globalization 
also pluralizes, and pluralization creates secularization.  Globalization also creates 
fundamentalism, which is a reaction to its counterpart of liberalization. Therefore, within 
the West, there is no return of religion. The “return of religion” model is constructed 
along the civilizational model of religion, which takes a Samuel Huntington’s approach 
of the Clash of Civilizations, whereby religion and culture and territory are inextricably 
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linked. But this is increasingly no longer the case, for globalization has disrupted all 
links. The effect of globalization is that there is no longer an intrinsic link between 
religion and culture.  Religion is disembedded, and therefore made abstract and virtual. 
This separation and parting of ways is the basis of the apparent religious revival and of 
the public visibility of religion.  As Olivier Roy writes, the  
religious ‘comeback’ is merely an optical illusion; it would be more appropriate to 
speak of transformation. Religion is both more visible and frequently in decline. 
We are witnessing a reformulation of religion rather than a return to ancestral 
practices abandoned during the secularist hiatus.71  
 
This notion of the reformulation of religion through secularization gets at the center of 
what Roy argues throughout his Holy Ignorance. Religion is transformed, and no longer 
consists of ‘a return to ancestral practices’, that is, the inculturated and civilizational 
institutional forms of traditional religion. Religion has not returned in the same shape and 
form as it once was before the long eclipse of the Enlightenment – a territorialized and 
culturally embedded historical unit of cohesive social expression -- but it has rather 
reformulated into a deterittorialised universal of individual religiosities that gather 
together in ‘faith communities’. The return of religion, or rather the reaction of religion, 
is due to the process of globalization, and its apparent return is instead a symptom of 
thoroughgoing Westernization and secularization. The religious revival is itself a 
production and play of secularization at work, or as Roy puts it, “Secularism engenders 
religion.”72   
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Furthermore, regarding the increase of secularization, from a purely demographic 
perspective, secularization found its largest growth in the twentieth century. As religious 
demographers Todd Johnson and Brian Grim observe in their analysis of the religiously 
unaffiliated and secular cohorts that, “In 1910 the world was home to very few atheists 
and agnostics. By 2010, they numbered in the hundreds of millions and represented 
11.8% of the human population.”73 The 20th century was in fact the premier hallmark and 
expansive growth of unbelief, notwithstanding the rise of political religion since the 
1970’s. Despite the necessary correction of the once prevalent and triumphalist classical 
secularization theory, this macro-narrative of the contemporary “resurgence of religion” 
is problematized by its tendency of proclaiming the obverse of a global sacralization or 
re-enchantment.  To correct the pendulum that swung too far into the universal 
inevitability of secularization, we cannot overestimate in the other direction of a grand 
religious revival of a sacralization. 
There is additional evidence of the sociological data on the “return of religion” 
that suggests, according to Jose Casanova, that secularization has gained a stronghold 
within the West as opposed to religious revitalization. As Casanova writes,   
...there is little evidence of any significant religious revival among the population 
of Western European societies, except among immigrant groups….Actually, the 
rate of secularization in many European societies may have reached a point of no 
return.74 
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For Jose Casanova, who borrows Daniele Hervieu-Leger’s term of religion as “a chain of 
memory,” argues that this chain of memory 
appears broken almost without repair and large generations of young Europeans 
are growing up without any personal relationship with or even knowledge of the 
Christian religious tradition. Not only the Christian churches, but most 
importantly families have lost their role in the process of religious socialization.75   
 
Europe is not at yet at a point to speak of the post-secular, and because of such, it is 
premature to speak of the return of religion. It is here at this point where Olivier Roy and 
Jose Casanova concur, insofar as the upcoming European generations, those born into 
deculturated religion, are born into the generation of Holy Ignorance, that of secularized 
societies that have severed the “chain of memory”, the religious traditions that created 
inculturated, civilizational religion which provided a fortification of religious identity that 
was able to be transmitted to the next generations within an organic, fluid manner. Holy 
Ignorance means ignorance of religious tradition, which is the disruption of religion as a 
“chain of memory”. 
After deculturation there are a series of intended and unintended consequences, 
such as the obliteration of the middle ground within debates regarding religion and the 
public square, or the loss of the social cohesion and expression of religion, such as 
exemplified within the pure religion of fundamentalism or the pure religion of liberalized 
spiritualities. Secularization defines and separates what is “religion” from what is 
“culture”, creating a widening divide between believer and non-believer, and thereby 
arresting and preventing “inculturation” of religion. The result of separating religion from 
its traditional link to a particular cultural embedding is the creation of a “pure religion”, 
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where “religion is forced to be religion and nothing else”.76 Purity, the idea of a pure 
religion, of a pure faith, of a pure past corroded by the profane present, of a pure future 
that lies ahead, is the new form of religion and religiosity. One must purify oneself from 
the sins of the world as with the fundamentalist, just as one must purify oneself from the 
shackles of religious dogma as with ‘the spiritual but not religious’. Roy writes that 
“contemporary conversions look for the ‘purely religious’ and entail the constitution of 
‘faith communities’ that, even when they do not sever their ties with the surrounding 
society, insist on being purely religious.”77 Purity of religion is one of the characteristics 
markers of the contemporary experience of the individual searching for his preferential 
option of faith within globalized spiritual marketplace of religiosities. 
What deculturated religion shows is that the secularizing forces that are at work 
within the liberalized religious communities are the same forces that are creating the 
kinds of religiosity experienced and expressed with the conservative religious 
communities. The public visibility of religion consists of the fact that the alternative 
expressions of religion is a symptom of secularization, insofar as it manifests the de-
institutionalization of religion and the decline of religious authority through the 
individualization of religious beliefs. There is a confluence, in that reflexive modernity is 
characterized by an individualization that privatizes the absolute sovereignty of the 
individual's choice, preferences and value judgments, while globalization publicizes 
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religion by removing it from any necessary connection from the spatial limitations of 
territorial region, making it freely available to all. The nexus between individualization 
and deterritorialization creates a global religious market, which leads to either 
secularization or fundamentalism.   
Sociologist Ulrich Beck indicates that, “the door that opens here swings in two 
opposite directions: a fundamentalist anti-modernity on the one hand, post-modern 
religious diversity.”78 Modernity is therefore a wheel that spins both ways and in two 
different directions. The atheist and the fundamentalist both alike reject religious 
authority, and secularization can be expressly understood as the decline of religious 
authority. “Contemporary believers put far more stress on faith, on spiritual experience, 
on individual and personal rediscovery of religion, than on legacy, culture, transmission, 
authority, and theology”, according to Roy.79 And such rejections of religious authority 
can be seen within the two global trends of modern religion that are crucially shaping 
Western society and politics in the 21st century, that of the “Nones” (or “Spiritual but not 
Religious”) and that of radical jihadist terrorists groups such as ISIS. The ‘Nones’ reject 
all forms of institutional religion, and as they are usually agnostic rather than atheist, and 
spiritual rather than religious, they singularly express the definition of secularization as 
the rejection of religious authority. But the same can be said about ISIS, which on one 
account they can be defined as thoroughly modern since they are fundamentalist 
reactionaries, and on another account they are liberalized since they resist all appropriate 
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Islamic institutions of definition and appropriation. Religious identity is no longer 
founded and confined to the official channels of appropriate theological institutionalized 
centers of authority, but rather religious identity rather self-determined by the subject and 
agent themselves. ISIS is Islamic because they say they are, and their motives are 
theological because they admit and confess that they are theological based on their 
hermeneutic of the text, which rejects traditional Islamic interpretations of the Koran in 
favor of interpretations that finds their genealogy with Sayid Qutb, and in the end their 
hermeneutic finds its ultimate locus within the individual himself. As put by Olivier Roy, 
“the self is the truth; faith, not religion is the truth”80 
Globalization is not a singular process but rather is best described as a set of 
tensions, paradoxes, contradictions, conflicts and unintended consequence that carry 
across the multiple secularities and modernities of various nations and geographical 
regions. For instance, the global economy of merging transnational corporations is often 
in tension with the politics of nation-states defined along territorial lines, and the culture 
of commodification inherent within this free flow of market capitalism is often in conflict 
with the values, habits and lifestyles of local indigenous identities. The outcome of 
fractured globalization and secularization is that religion first “deculturates” and then 
begins to de-territorialize, whereby the religious markers or symbols separates itself from 
its original cultural, political and historical context and free flows through the 
dissemination of ideas via technology and the global migrations of people. German 
sociologist Ulrich Beck has pointed out that globalizations renders  
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the simultaneous presence and availability of all (world) religions and cultural and 
spiritual symbolic worlds, from the ‘most primitive’ to the ‘most modern’, 
separated for the most part from their temporal and spatial context, and open to 
every conceivable appropriation and misappropriation throughout the world, 
including terrorist ones.81  
 
Deculturation is decontextualization. Carl Raschke writes that  
“religion ‘returns’ only because it is ‘rhizomic’, it is a constant pressure beneath 
the surface of the deep; its double sourcing becomes the double sentencing of 
what Deleuze understands as ‘territorialized’ self identity and ‘de-
territorialized’—mobile or ‘nomadic’—signifiers that are in ‘flight’ toward 
unchartered destinations in the history of thought. De-territorialization is what 
Derrida characterizes as ‘de-racination’. The modern era of ‘Enlightenment’ 
constitutes a progressive detteritoritorialization of the existential ‘situation’ of 
faith...82 
 
What is emerging is the rhizomic spread of the simulacra and icon of images, messages, 
through communicative technologies that spread deculturated religion. Religion therefore 
“deculturates” and is “formatted” into an autonomous site that engenders the semiotic 
production of religious markers that are capable of global expansion within either a liner, 
disjointed or paradoxical exportation. With this interpretation being accessible and wide 
open, this creates a further chasm, as religion can be interpreted either in a benign sense 
as we see with the Nones, or in a fundamentalist sense, as we see with ISIS. What begins 
to emerge are extremes, polarities, and bifurcated opposites. Globalization creates 
dualities just as much as it homogenizes. What happens is that we have the obliteration of 
the moderation within public debate. Political scientist Eric Kaufmann observes, in the 
West “moderate religion is in decline, caught between a Syclla of secularism and a 
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Charybdis of fundamentalism. What we see is a final reckoning between religion and the 
Enlightenment, with individuals forced to choose between the two.”83 Deculturation is 
the obliteration of nominal, inculturated, and moderate religion. Religion and culture 
have parted ways.   
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Chapter 2. The Return of Religion through Religious Demographics 
Demography, the return of religion and secularization are linked together within the 
paradigm of globalization. Is there a return of religion within Western societies through 
the high fertility rates of religious cohorts versus the low fertility of secular cohorts? 
Certain demographers and political scientists have argued in favor for the scenario of the 
reversal of secularization through the abundant fecundity of the religious.  The religious 
shall inherit the earth, as argued by Eric Kaufmann, through the sheer force of 
reproduction, because high religiosity correlates strongly with high fertility. The religious 
tend on average to have more children than the non-religious.   
However, Olivier Roy’s thesis of deculturation contradicts this possibility of the 
religious inheriting the earth through the overabundance of child bearing, because 
deculturated religion lacks the inherit ability to transmit religion and religious identity to 
the next generation. Deculturated religion is one that consists of personal conversion and 
is fundamentally a ‘born-again’ experience that requires an individual faith commitment 
towards the norms and codes of that religion. Such an individuated faith cannot be passed 
down within a smooth transition within secularized societies, as this kind of born-again 
faith requires each individual to decide for himself.  Deculturated religion is the loss of 
nominal religion, which means the loss of religion as a cultural identity. The 
demographic thesis of the reversal of religion through fertility rates is thereby contested, 
as the children of religious parents will be thrown into pluralized western societies where 
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the tendency is to disaffiliate or liberalize within the secular milieu. Secularization, which 
correlates with low fertility rates, creates the reaction of the religious who attempt a re-
sacralization through high fertility rates. Such a reaction is a characteristic of deculturated 
fundamentalist religion.  
Furthermore, both attitudes of the secular and the religious towards child bearing 
are centered around choice, which is a byproduct of individualized autonomy. As 
globalization is the driving force that transforms religion into a reaction against the 
secularized immanent frame, this plays out in the will to reproduce and in the choice of 
retaining the faith. Deculturated religion ensures that each generational cohort must make 
that choice of whether or not to retain the faith of his or her parents. For Olivier Roy, this 
is not likely. 
Globalization and Religious Demography 
The resurgence of religion can be understood within the dynamics of human population, 
which if we follow Manfred Steger’s definition of globalization as principally “shifting 
forms of human contact”84, central to any theory of religion and globalization would 
necessitate a demographic dimension. “Demography is destiny”—a phrase coined in the 
1970’s by Ben Wattenberg and Richard Scammons in The Real Majority, suggests the 
capable dynamic of changes in human population to powerfully and persuasively shape 
the political and cultural landscape of any given nation or state.85 One can criticize this by 
saying that to understand demography in terms of destiny is yet another reductionism. 
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But this is to largely miss the point, for as American political scientist Jack Goldstone 
points out, “to admit that demography is not destiny is not to deny its power.”86 
Goldstone likens the force of demography to the weight of gravity: inasmuch as gravity is 
capable of being defied through human ingenuity, this feat has not been accomplished 
through ignoring or dismissing its force, but has occurred rather through our own 
measures of gravity’s interactions and understanding of its nature; this similarly applies 
to demography. The transformative force of social and cultural processes that reside at 
the core of globalization—collaboration within global civil society, conflict between 
religious and political identities, and the current vast increase in migration that is 
challenging the identity and boundaries of the nation-state—can be relatively elucidated 
through an investigation of the magnitude, composition and distribution of human 
population. As British sociologist David Voas has written, “People enter, exit, and move 
within religion, just as they are born, will die, and migrate, in life.”87 Whether for war or 
peace, the demographic factor “must be considered as a major factor of politics alongside 
classic materialist, idealist and institutional perspectives”, and should be placed within 
the core of any investigation of globalization and the resurgence of religion.  
Within this context of globalization, demographics and the resurgence of religion, 
there are possible challenges to secularism within one of the basic parameters of 
demography, that of birthrates. In short, in every major world religion there is a strong 
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pronatalist trend, and it is demographically projected that the religious are set to outbirth 
the non-religious at such a prodigious rate, that it is argued that there will occur a stalling 
and possible modest reversal of secularization within the United States and Europe 
around 2050.88 For there is a strong connection between religiosity and fertility, and this 
is largely due to the force that religion plays within the social cohesion and moral 
tradition of these communities that are oriented towards transcendent goals. The fact is 
that on average “conservative religious values tend to be associated with higher fertility, 
while liberal secular values predict lower birthrates”.89 Values stand above 
socioeconomics when it comes to determining the rate and amount of fertility. While 
most modern, secularized developed countries and many developing countries are well 
under the total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1—the ‘magic’ or ‘golden’ number for a society to 
reproductively replace itself—those of conservative, religious communities resist this 
general direction in fertility rates, choosing to remain at or above the golden number. In 
2011, political scientist Eric Kaufmann along with Austrian demographers Anne Goujon 
and Vegard Skirbekk released the article “The End of Secularization in Europe? A Socio-
Demographic Perspective” in which they argue that “a combination of higher religious 
fertility, immigration, and slowing rates of religious apostasy will eventually produce a 
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reversal in the decline of the religious population in Western Europe”.90 Religiosity, 
migration and fertility play a strong role in the United States as well, where secular 
Americans have an average total fertility rate of 1.66, as opposed to Catholics who 
average at 2.3, Protestants at 2.21, and Muslims at 2.84, and where the birthrate of those 
with religious conservative views in regard to abortion is two-thirds higher on average 
than those who hold to “pro-choice” views. 91 In 2010, Kaufmann, Goujon and Vegard 
released the first cohort-component based projection of the main religions of the United 
States in Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the 
United States to 2043, whose results showed that “the low fertility of secular Americans 
and the religiosity of immigrants provide a countervailing force to secularization…”.92 
The largest immigrant cohort, Hispanic Catholics, will experience the strongest growth of 
any ethno-religious group, expanding to 18 percent of the American population by 
2043.93  
With this sort of differential fertility gap between the religious and the 
nonreligious, and between those with conservative and liberal values and beliefs, 
Kaufmann and Skirbekk project the possibility that “American religious conservatism 
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will most likely strengthen in years to come unless liberals close the fertility gap.”94 And 
if religious conservatism rises through an increase of its stock and an expansion of its 
culture, what challenges will this bring to the values and identities within the quarters of 
liberalism?95 This shift stands to offset the effect of liberalism within the United States 
and Europe, however modest or however grand. Yet, a further question to be raised is: 
does modern, secular, political/cultural liberalism contain the necessary resources of 
tradition, social cohesion and civitas—“the spontaneous willingness to make sacrifices 
for some public good”96—necessary to close this fertility gap between those conservative 
religious communities who value high fertility in their doctrine (to be fruitful and 
multiply) and ethos (eschatological sacrifice for the world to come). Political scientist 
Eric Kaufman is skeptical of liberalism’s pronatalist capability, for as social theorist 
Daniel Bell has pointed out in his Contradiction of Capitalism, there is located within 
modern, liberal society a fundamental contradiction, which is “the relation between self-
interest and the public interest, between personal impulses and community 
requirements.”97 The present cultural condition is characterized by a sense of individual 
entitlements, an argot that often masks under the pretensions of human flourishing, which 
at its core resembles more ‘unrestrained appetite’ and unfettered individualistic impulse 
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than the realization of the public good. In the modern realm of human reproduction and 
childbearing—where self-interest and individualistic aesthetic impulse, to say the least, is 
not necessarily a virtue towards achieving high fertility—we may perhaps find here the 
vulnerability of liberalism and secularization. As Kaufmann put it, “liberalism’s 
demographic contradiction—individualism leading to the choice not to reproduce—may 
well be the agent that destroys it.”98 In short, religious growth via high fertility rates, in 
direct opposition to the low fertility rates of the nonreligious, will become a major 
impetus of social, cultural and political change within the context of globalization and the 
resurgence of religion in the ensuing decades.  
The triumph of religious fertility has its precedence in Western history. Just take 
American sociologist Rodney Stark’s The Rise of Christianity for example, who argues 
that, “superior fertility played a significant role in the rise of Christianity.” 99 Christian 
fertility had far surpassed that of the Greco-Roman empire—which was already well 
below 2.1 replacement levels at the inception of Christianity—through its refusal of “the 
attitudes and practices that caused pagans to have low fertility”100 Christianity rejected 
the common Greco-Roman pagan cultural patterns of fertility: abortion, infanticide of 
females and deformed males, birth control devices, divorce, cohabitation, and any other 
social factors which lead to a natural decrease in fertility rates. The ethos and habits of 
fertility within Christianity, which was a result from Judaism’s scriptural injunction to 
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‘be fruitful and multiply’, encouraged pronatalism through the cultural pattern of marital 
fidelity and the moral reinforcement of the marital conjugal act as bearing a natural 
connection to reproduction. These values and practices of pronatalism that characterized 
the spirit of Christianity crucially aided its growth within the Greco-Roman empire, and 
among other important social factors, Christianity saw its rise from a population of about 
1,000 Christians from the year 40 C.E. to a robust estimate of around 33 million by 350 
C.E. This pattern of growth, which Rodney Stark averages to about 40 percent per 
decade, mimics the growth of 20th century Mormonism, which averaged at 43 percent per 
decade.101 Monica Duffy Toft traces this growth to Mormonism’s “strongly pronatalist 
theology, history and subculture…”102 that presently continues to have a strong influence 
on Mormon fertility. And Mormonism has grown into a more visible contender in the 
public square. In 2004, the GOP received 97 percent of the Mormon vote, which is “the 
most partisan voting record of any ethnic or religious group in the United States.”103 They 
have recently pervaded the television, Internet and billboards with the cultural campaign 
“I am a Mormon”, and were also instrumental in placing one of their own as the 2012 
Republican Party presidential nominee. This influential growth of a religious group that 
solidly identifies with a particular set of values is the visible effect of a pronatalist 
theology and an ethos of high fertility. Much like the rise of Christianity in the Greco-
Roman era, what happens in the private sphere of reproductive choice does not remain 
silent in the public square.   
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Globalization of Fertility Decline 
Political theologies of pronatalism must be set within the greater global context of our 
present demographic situation. The world is on the cusp of a demographic transition that 
can reasonably be described in the terms of an upheaval or revolution. The 21st century 
will be the age of ‘greying’ or hyperaging cohorts within the world’s developed 
countries, which will shrink their labor forces and direct economic strength to the world’s 
developing countries.104 In conjunction with the age of the ‘greying’ cohorts there will 
also come the global plummet of fertility rates. The world’s population as a whole has 
initialized a reversal in its momentum towards growth and is set on a trajectory towards 
decline. There is a common perception, due in part to the effects of human overcrowding 
taking place in urbanization and the all too apparent wastefulness in our age of hyper 
consumption, that we are overpopulating and possibly headed towards an ecological 
disaster of cataclysmic proportions. This is a hangover from the force of mortality decline 
that took place with the onset of industrialization and modern advancements in 
technologies and medicine. This first demographic transition, which took place roughly 
around the onset of the 19th century, initiated a mixed condition of high fertility in 
conjunction with low mortality, and thus created a watershed population boom. This vast 
increase in population drew attention and speculation from people such as the English 
cleric Thomas Malthus, whose famous An Essay on the Principle of Population set the 
demographic trend for the next two centuries by essentially arguing that prodigious 
population growth makes possible the condition for national poverty. Malthus reasoned 
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that human population should be understood in terms of total population vs. total 
resources, and that the overwhelming demands of population through proliferation of 
human fertility without any set limitations would inevitably outweigh the supply of 
resources. Over a century later the Malthusian thesis developed into its most sensational 
expression, when during the mid 1960’s Paul Ehrlich’s released The Population Bomb, a 
best seller that predicted mass starvations and other forms of cataclysm due to 
overpopulation. This landmark work fueled the common public perception of an 
imminent population disaster to come. Ehrlich’s cautionary tales along with others of its 
ilk influenced opinions to limit the growth of human population, advocating that 
considerable change and policy measures in the area of reproductive rights should begin 
to take place in order to allay the consequences and fears of wide spread famine, global 
ecological catastrophe and wide scale energy resource depletion, 
The alarmist overpopulation thesis is now largely if not entirely discredited. First, 
consider that the United Nations Population Division projects that the terminus to our 
global population growth is around 2050, which all thing being equal, will balance at 
around 9.15 billion people.105 This terminus to global population growth must also take 
into account coextensive global fertility recession. The world’s total fertility rate was at 
6.0 when Ehrlich released his sensational book, yet since then, within the course of three 
to four decades the global TFR sunk to an average of 2.52.106 Ben Wattenberg was in the 
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1980’s pointing out in his The Birth Dearth that fertility rates all over the nations of the 
developed world had already dipped well below the TFR magic number of 2.1 children. 
Then around 2004, Wattenberg was still able to maintain his earlier depopulation thesis, 
writing bluntly in his book Fewer that “never have birth and fertility rates fallen so far, 
so fast, so low, for so long, in so many places, so surprisingly”.107 This precipitous drop 
in fertility rates that he saw in the late 80’s had not yet abated—as predicted or hoped for 
by some pundits—and simply continued in its unprecedented global free fall. Wolfgang 
Lutz and his associates in the World Population Program at IIASA in Austria maintain 
that:  
Over the last three decades birth rates have been on the decline in virtually all 
countries of the world, and it is estimated that already more than half of the 
world’s population has below replacement level fertility…An increasing number 
of countries have birth rates that are not just somewhat below replacement 
fertility, but far below that level.108  
 
Additionally, this fertility decline, insofar as is known, has no prominent reason for a 
probable reversal without the implementation of pronatalist policy measures. The 
presumption of a naturally occurring permanent equilibrium within human fertility rates 
is at best hopeful, and at worst naïve. In other words, there is a threshold of human 
fertility decline that is able be traversed, a supposed bottom line ‘safety net’ that is 
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possible to collapse under the burden of the will to not reproduce. What now 
characterizes modernity is the force of fertility’s uninterrupted descent.  
There is at current offered a vast constellation of reasons and interdependent 
connections for the global decline in fertility: those that are institutional, issues of gender 
equality, our present economic crisis, our present economic growth, increasing access 
towards education, the population density of urbanization, and matters as mundane as 
infant car seats or the ongoing battle between the so-called Bohemian bourgeois dog 
owners and Bohemian bourgeois parents over claims to common territory in city parks. 
The most prominent reason offered, however, is a feature of Second Demographic 
Transition Theory, which argues that there was an ideational shift from a concern for the 
well being of the family to the concern for the well being of the individual. Developed by 
the Belgian demographer Ron Lesthaeghe and Dutch demographer Dirk van de Kaa, 
Second Demographic Transition theorizes that individual preference determines fertility 
rate, disputing the common and classical notion that socioeconomic development is the 
all-encompassing framework for fertility decline. In observing the population trends of 
fertility decline that took place in the mid 1960’s, which according to demographer John 
Caldwell was the historical moment when the world experienced “almost certainly the 
first major global decline in history,”109 Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa perceived that when 
it comes to conceiving children, the individual’s concern exceeds a simple bottom line of 
economic well being, income and available resources. What is preoccupying the popular 
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imagination is a sense of self-fulfillment, which can be described as personal ambitions 
of a post-materialist nature that regards individual freedom towards self-expression and 
self-realization as the penultimate consummation of livelihood. These European 
demographers borrowed their definition of ‘post-materialism’ from the American 
political scientist Ronald Inglehart, who defines post-materialists as those who “place 
more emphasis on self-fulfillment through careers, rather than through ensuring the 
survival of the species”, and whose telos of life is aimed “out of the family toward 
broader social and leisure activities” which foster cultural individualism.110  
The shift towards the invested wellbeing and happiness of the individual has its 
origins with the invested wellbeing and happiness of the family. This was first theorized 
by the French historian Philippe Aries, who when noticing the onset of childlessness that 
was becoming increasingly endemic to his native France and surrounding Europe in the 
mid 1960’s, theorized that a transition was taking place within the organization of family 
life.  
Philippe Aries writes:    
The ways people look at life usually are determined by more mysterious, more 
indirect causes, I feel that a profound, hidden, but intense relationship exists 
between the long term pattern of the birth rate and attitudes toward the child. The 
decline in the birth rate that began at the end of the eighteenth century and 
continued until the 1930’s was unleashed by an enormous sentimental and 
financial investment in the child. I see the current decrease in the birth rate as 
being, on the contrary, provoked by exactly the same attitude. The days of the 
child-king are over. The under-forty generation is leading us into a new epoch, 
one in which the child, to say the least, occupies a smaller place.111 
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Aries argues that during the days of the ‘child-king’ there was a ‘bourgeois model’ of the 
family characterized by ‘altruistic ends’ in the reproduction and rearing of children. This 
‘altruism’ entailed investing in the quality of the children’s education and future, which 
thereby required limiting the quantity of children that the parents would conceive in order 
to procure the social and economic resources necessary for their progeny’s success and 
security. However, this same ‘sentimental and financial investment’ shifted to what Aries 
calls the ‘individualistic model’, in which the emphasis was no longer placed on the 
flourishing of the children but rather on the flourishing and self-interests of the parents. 
The parents were to then interpret children in terms of how they would possibly benefit 
the happiness and self-fulfillment of the parents themselves. This model of cultural 
individualism and self-realization of the parents became the new reasoning behind their 
desire in conceiving children, and affected the parent’s decision when choosing how 
many children to bear, which became fewer and fewer.  
An additional social factor to consider that was crucial in achieving low fertility 
was the widespread use of efficient, modern contraception since the mid twentieth 
century. Dirk van de Kaa notes that, “the availability of new, highly effective means of 
contraception had created a sort of ‘second contraceptive revolution’ as it was later 
called”.112 This revolution that made contraception convenient and morally acceptable to 
the general public weakened the male’s total control of fertility by the traditional 
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contraceptive methods of coitus interuptus and condoms, and empowered the female in 
her control over sexual activity and fertility with the efficiency encapsulated in the pill 
and other modern methods. Wolfgang Lutz lays out the problem clearly: 
 …through the introduction of modern contraception, the evolutionary link 
between the drive for sex and procreation has been broken and now reproduction 
is merely a function of individual preferences and culturally determined norms.113  
 
Post-materialist cultural individualism coupled with modern contraception proved a 
wrecking ball to maintaining replacement level fertility.  
Further, this ideational shift towards low fertility was a “marginal behavior” that 
developed unto the “potentially universal,” as put by French demographer Jean-Claude 
Chesnais, fellow of the Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris.114 What was once the 
practice of the bourgeois middle and upper class within developed countries became the 
endemic practice of the mass culture. This globalized expansion of cultural liberalism 
took place through the mediascape, initiating imitation of these particular cultural 
representations of human fertility and reproductive behavior. Daniel Bell theorized in The 
Coming of Post-Industrial Society that,  
The life style once practiced by a small cenacle, is now copied by many…. [and] 
this change of scale gave the culture of the 1960’s its special surge, coupled with 
the fact that a bohemian life-style once limited to a tiny elite is now acted out on 
the giant screen of the mass media.115 
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Needless to say, mass media since the 60’s has come a long way, and what is ‘acted out 
on the giant screen’ is directed through the global system of the Internet and the 
marketing of Hollywood culture to widen its scale and scope of reach. This engineering 
of human desire through the globalized mediascape produces what Vegard Skirbekk calls 
a ‘low-fertility trap’, where “low fertility begets lower desired fertility, which in turn 
drives fertility even lower, and so on….”.116 As the ‘golden’ or ‘magic’ replacement 
number of 2.1 children begins to seem as one too many, family size increasingly 
diminishes to smaller amounts, and each successive generation becomes acclimated and 
accustomed to further small families. This sub-par amount becomes a cultural pattern, 
normalizing just how many children one may desire to conceive. This downward spiral in 
which modern, secularized culture hastens, a cultural lifestyle of unfettered enjoyment 
and self-interest that removes the impediments to is own realization—which is in this 
case turns out to be children—is resisted, however, by the fecund communities of the 
religious.  
The Resulting Global Wombfare 
Political regimes subsequently follow demographic regimes. Eastern Orthodox 
theologian David Bentley Hart, writing of the cultural wars that are antagonizing the 
United States, considered how might those with conservative tendencies may truly resist 
and rebel against the widespread libertine culture that has become in his estimation 
dissolute. After considering a range of options, Hart playfully yet provocatively 
concludes that:  
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Probably the most subversive and effective strategy we might undertake would be 
one of militant fecundity: abundant, relentless, exuberant and defiant 
childbearing. Given the reluctance of modern men and women to be fruitful and 
multiply, it would not be difficult, surely, for the devout to accomplish—in no 
more than a generation or two—a demographic revolution.117 
 
Though Hart, as he later made clear in another article to his outraged detractors, was 
writing more to amuse than actually obliging the faithful towards ‘militant fecundity’, his 
kind of rhetoric is authentically mobilized in other religious communities, such as in the 
protestant ‘Quiverfull’ movement in the United States, or in Yaser Arafat’s notion of a 
‘biological time bomb’ of Palestinian high fertility set to explode and disrupt Israel 
within several generations. This language and assertive ideology of active and militant 
and childbearing is what Harvard Professor of Public Policy Monica Duffy Toft labels 
‘wombfare’, a tactic that is employed in the long term battle between the cultures of the 
left and right.  
The political theology of wombfare is particularly acute in Israel, providing the 
starkest contrast of a fertility gap between the religious and nonreligious. In a society 
founded by secular Zionists, the demographic rise of the Haredim through pronatalism 
will have a significant influence on the future of the political and economic security of 
Israel. Just between 1980-1996, the Ultra-Orthodox Jews or Haredim fertility rates grew 
from 6.49 to 7.61, while other Israeli Jews, seculars among them, saw a drop from 2.61 to 
2.27.118 Israeli economist Dan ben David, who poses this fertility gap as an ‘existential 
problem’, writes in the Haaretz,  
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It is difficult to overstate the pace at which Israeli society is changing…If we 
don’t find a way to integrate these populations into a shared Israeli narrative, and 
immediately, then in another generation or two—at most—the demographic 
balance within Israel will change the country beyond recognition.119  
 
The high fertility within the communities of the Haredim is supported by a religious ethos 
that also reinforces the allegiance of the Haredim towards their religious community, and 
at the same time fortifies their resistance towards any possible conversion to secular 
beliefs. In his Meditteranean Identity, Professor David Ohana of the Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev states that “The outstanding contemporary characteristic of 
Israeli society is the fragmentation of the Israeli identity into secondary elements that 
overshadow the specific quality of Israeliness.”120 For Ohana, ‘Israeliness’ represents a 
region of religious cross-fertilization that bridges the various cultures of the 
Meditarrenean basin of Greece, Italy, Egypt and Turkey into a cultural theory of 
Levantism, which is a humanism with a distinctive Israeli cosmopolitanism. However, 
the continuous growth of what Ohana calls fragmentary ‘secondary elements’ will within 
decades demographically eclipse the primary political and cultural whole, and through a 
political theology of revelation and pronatalism the values of the Haredim stand to 
challenge that definitive quality of ‘Israeliness’ or secular humanism to which Ohana is 
allied to. 
And as for Europe, dread was the popular symptom of the alarmist reactions 
towards the viral YouTube video “Muslim Demographics”, which gained more than 10 
million hits within a space of two months since its inception in 2009. This sensational 
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phenomenon set the high fertility rates of Muslim immigrants in opposition to the low 
fertility rates of native Western Europeans, claiming the French Muslim TFR at 8.1 in 
contrast to the native French TFR at 1.8.121 Though the below replacement level of the 
French native TFR was correct, the French Muslim TFR of the video was excessively 
exaggerated. Despite the inflated projections of the “Muslim Demographics” TFR, the 
anxiety and unease in which the video was received by the general public lays out the 
problem clearly: Europe’s conscience suffers disquiet from its own sense of demographic 
decline, its own sense of loss of identity through a challenge to the core of its culture 
through religious immigrants and high fertility. This problem is exacerbated in that 
Europe has trouble in defining just what constitutes and unifies the cultural identity of 
‘Europe’. In its pursuit of multiculturalism through the framework of secularism it seems 
to forget that all dialogue requires a presupposed identity, and an assertive secularism 
largely fails when it comes to cultural unity and social cohesion. Europe cannot be simply 
identified by geographical boundaries, as it requires a social bond that is necessarily 
civilizational and developed from within a particular moral and cultural tradition. Yet 
Europe has in effect become constituted by what French sociologist Danielle Hervieu-
Leger calls “amnesic societies”, which are incapable of “maintaining the memory which 
lies at the heart of their religious existence.”122 This amnesia of Europe’s Christian 
religious memory and erosion of its Christian moral tradition is in part due to Europe’s 
own will to forget its universalizing past of violence. Europe’s recollection of its 
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expansionist history has brought a sense of shame towards its civilizational heritage, and 
this shame has brought along with it a loss of self-confidence in Europe’s own Christian 
spiritual and religious traditions. French philosopher Remi Brague writes that Europe “no 
longer believes that what it has to offer is likely to interest those who chanced to be born 
outside its frontiers.”123 Because of this loss of memory through the violent trauma of its 
past, Europe has adopted an attitude of what former president of the European 
Commission Jacque Delors called the ‘motor’ of ‘Never Again’, which was “translated 
into a movement of reconciliation…[that]…was now a matter of uniting peoples and 
bringing nations together, without however making the nation state disappear.”124 Delors 
believed that the ‘will towards reconciliation’ steadily marching under the banner of 
‘Never Again’ needed a necessary cultural or spiritual bond that was absent in the 
discourse of constructing a European Union. Delors had attempted to bring Christian 
churches into the discussion of constructing a European identity, arguing that in order for 
Europe to achieve its goal towards unity, it must first recognize that “‘the EC lacks a 
heart and soul’.”125 Delors understood that identifying a center or ‘heart and soul’ of 
Europe that unites its cultural and spiritual identity is a necessary condition towards 
justice, reconciliation, and unity. Yet if Europe continues to deny this and refuse to 
recognize its own particular Christian heritage and moral tradition out of an unfounded 
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fear of a return to a theocratic Medieval past or out of its debilitating remorse over its 
history of violent, universal expansion, will it continue to suffer from a loss of cultural, 
social cohesion that will leave the identity of Europe naked and “open to the expansion of 
newer peoples who still care for bonds of family and religion,”126 as Phillip Jenkins 
points out in God’s Continent?  The problem lies with deculturation that breaks the bond 
of religion as chain of memory. Europe has entered the age of Holy Ignorance.  
The Criticism of Religious Transmission 
An analysis of the discussion from the perspective of Olivier Roy would raise certain 
issues and several critiques. The first is to point out that the thesis of post-material 
individualization that is driving the decline of the secular birth rate is a case in point of 
what Roy calls “formatting” or the standardization of religiosity, in that the secularizing 
conditions that are determining the decline of the birth rates of secular cohorts is at the 
same time engendering the strict religiosity that creates an uptick in the religious cohorts 
birth rates. Modernity is the wheel that spins culture both ways, either towards 
liberalization or towards fundamentalism, thus the post-material values of post-industrial 
societies determine the behavior of not just secular cohorts but also religious cohorts. As 
Roy writes, “the achievements of the Sixties have become mainstream”, and we see the 
Sex and the City ethos that contributes to the bourgeois bohemian lifestyle of low fertility 
rates diffused through the globalized technology of the media.127 It is a case in point of 
Rene Girard’s notion of mimesis. On the other hand, we also see the religious use the 
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media as well to encourage higher fertility rate and mobilize the faithful towards the 
choice to reproduce, such as seen with James Dobson Focus on the Family, or the 
Quiverfull Movement. Roy writes that, “The family is no longer sacrosanct; opting for a 
family life is presented as an individual choice, a desire for self-realization and not as a 
compliance with some natural law.”128 Globalization is the secularizing force that drives 
both the decline of the TFR of the secular cohorts as well as the increase of the TFR for 
religious cohorts.  
 The fact that the religious see themselves as embattled against the surrounding, 
hostile secular culture, and are using birth rates or “wombfare” as a form of combat, 
supports Roy’s thesis of religion and culture parting ways. The encroaching secular 
culture forces the religious to reconstruct child bearing as a sacred duty to re-sacralize the 
godless societies through the force of re-population. The liberalized sexual mores of post 
1960’s secular culture puts the religious on the defensive, and therefore they stand as 
reactionary, which according to Martin Marty is the defining sole characteristic of 
religious fundamentalism.  
 The next issue is that of transmission, or the passing of religious identity towards 
the children. Roy writes that,  
But they all face the question: how does on transmit the faith? Particularly when 
the parents are converts or born-again, since transmission is no longer guaranteed 
by the social or cultural visibility of religion….How is the experience of a 
breakaway to be transmitted? How can one be born from a born-again?”129  
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Deculturation ensures that transmission of religious identity is disrupted, and 
deculturation creates the potential for religious identity to be hybridized. There is 
therefore no longer a seamless transition from parent to child when it comes to religious 
affiliation. A ‘breakaway’, that is a ‘born-again’ Christian or Muslim, one who is affected 
with an interior religious renewal towards a strict form of religiosity, cannot construct a 
stable transmission of identity towards his or her children, since the faith that is 
experienced is one of individual commitment and decision. To be born-again from a born 
again is an impossibility for Olivier Roy, or as is often heard in Christian revivalist 
circles: “God has children, but no grand-children.” The children must come to his or her 
personal conviction and experience of the faith, and can no longer solely rely on ties of 
family, or ethnic/cultural identity. Born-again faith disrupts all nominalist religion, which 
is the religion of culture, and of therefore civilization, and of therefore empire. 
To ensure the transmission of religious identity requires the strict commitment of 
an exclusive and closed faith community. These kinds of faith communities that are of 
the fundamentalist bent are, according to Roy, too difficult to maintain by the individual 
in the long run, especially in light of the enticements of the surrounding materialistic and 
indulgent character of the secular ethos. Roy points out that, “Dogmatism finds it hard to 
hold out in the long term if it is not upheld within a closed community. Many pass 
through Tablighism, Salafism, or Pentecostalism, but eventually leave.”130 The problem 
is, as Roy points out, is that “one of the characteristics of modern fundamentalisms is to 
replace spirituality with a system of norms and codes. Sin is no longer a part of the 
                                                        




system: when it occurs, it breaks it.”131  The problem of modern fundamentalism is that it 
is intolerant towards any ambiguity or grey area within the realm of morality and ethics, 
which exacerbates its tendency towards exclusivism against its opponents or within its 
own adherents. The issue of exclusivity within fundamentalist religious bodies is further 
highlighted within the secular culture of western societies, in which the dominant 
sentiment is that towards the ethos of inclusivity, and thereby creates a visibility of 
religion that does not line up with the dominant secularization that is in fact taking place. 
Religion is made strange, as it is situated on the rational stage of Weber’s ‘iron cage’. 
The attempt of the parents to stop the secularization of their children is a 
generational problem that each set of parents must attempt to overcome. When religion 
and culture were embedded within a civilizational whole, the transmission of religious 
identity was not a real problem. Because of deculturation, each successive generation 
must reconstitute itself as a ‘born-again’ generation. Roy discusses evangelical leader 
Thomas Rainer’s book The Bridger Generation, which is an attempt to analyze the 
cultural issues of the generation into which the author’s son was born into, in order to 
effectively evangelize them and offer an appropriate Christian response.132 The children 
of the religious are born into a secularized, pluralized climate that contributes towards a 
prone tendency towards disaffiliation.  Yet for Roy, this attempt to re-evangelize the next 
generation only “highlights the exteriority of religion in relation to cultural markers”, 
whereby there is no integral or organic link between religion and culture because of 
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secularization.133 This process of deculturation then puts a burden on the older generation 
to “pick from the floating cultural markers and pin them to religious markers: Christian 
rock, eco-kosher, halal fast –food”, and they “put on Christian rock parties, use ‘youth’ 
language, adopting the codes of the ‘tribe’ to preach to its members”.134 The further 
problem lies in that as each generation attempts to adopt the cultural markers of the 
successive generation in order to retain their affiliation, the cultural markers are in a state 
of rapid flux, suspect to the rapid changes of the free-market inherent within the process 
of globalization. Roy points out that, “the cultures they are targeting are in fact sub-
cultures, made up of codes and modes of consumption, they are transient…sub-cultures 
have always existed, but they can flourish today because it is possible to exist in a virtual 
space.”135  
The memes and the technology of the virtual spaces of the internet maintains and 
fashions sub-cultures of the religious and the secular—such as seen with ISIS, the Alt-
Right, and or the atheistic community of the Ex-Muslims—and thereby reproduces the 
semiotics of deterritorialisation and the secularization of deculturation. What we end up 
with is the dromology and flux of endless reproduction and repetition of virtual sub-
cultures that construct religious and non-religious identities within the over-arching 
immanent frame. Deculturation ensures that the sacred canopy becomes and remains 
pluralized and individuated sacred canopies within the various markets of the globalized 
secular and religious economies. The transmission of religious identity within Western 
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society is therefore rendered interminably problematic because of the deculturation 
process of globalization. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of Religious Conversion and Secularization 
In Holy Ignorance, Olivier Roy writes that, “Converts and the born-again are central to 
our study since they epitomize the phenomenon of the deculturation of religion.”136 
Conversions are significant for Roy in connection with ‘the return of religion’ in that  
they concern millions of people who shift from Catholicism to Protestantism (in 
Latin America and Africa, in the USA among the Latinos), tens of thousands from 
Christianity or atheism to Islam in Europe (youth from the French ‘underclass’) or 
from Islam to Christianity (among Iranian refugees in Turkey, Muslims in Central 
Asia or even in Algeria).137  
 
Olivier Roy also writes that  
the key factor in conversions is the lack of a connection between religion and 
culture; in other words, religions are recruiting with which they are traditionally 
associated, or are having a deculturation effect which is not followed by 
acculturation.138  
 
Contemporary religious conversions are characterized by individuation, accessible 
information, choice, optionality, and the political condition of liberal democracy that 
guarantees and protects freedom of religion and the right to convert. Contemporary 
religious conversions are specifically deculturated, deterritorialised, distinguished by the 
born-again experience, and they remain locked within the dialectic of the secularization 
process. Further, conversions do not only consist of a religious transition, but can be  
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secular in their nature, such as those who disaffiliate and secularize out from a religious 
cohort. Conversions therefore are suitable as a measure of secularization. 
What follows is an analysis of the main drivers of conversions towards 
secularization  (the Unaffiliated, the Nones), and the main drivers of conversions towards 
high levels of religiosity. The demographic scenario portrayed in the previous chapter, 
that of the correlation between fertility rates and religiosity, led to the notion of whether 
children will disaffiliate and secularize from religious faith and their inherited religious 
tradition. This chapter provides data to suggest that in fact there will be a tendency 
towards religious disaffiliation and secularization.  
Roy argues that secularization stands triumphant within the West because of 
deculturation, and the data I provide suggests that this is likely. I examine what are the 
main drivers of religious affiliation and secular dis-affiliation. With data provided from 
the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (Laxenburg, Austria), I use 
Human Development and Secondary Education as a proxy for modernization, and then 
correlate both with secularization.  I argue that Human development creates the 
ecological conditions necessary for trends of religious disaffiliation and secularization to 
occur. Furthermore, because globalization pluralizes, this exacerbates the move towards 
secularization, because of the condition of the optionality of faith made possible through 
pluralization.   
The Unaffiliated as a measure of Secularization 
Secularization in the West corresponds with the rise of the “Unaffiliated”, those who self-
identify as atheist or agnostic or who have no religious affiliation, and who comprise 1.1 
billion of the world’s population—that is roughly one-in-six of the world’s population are 
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unaffiliated—and who are the world’s third largest ‘religious’ body, just behind 
Christianity and Islam, as well as numbering greater than Hindus. One of the dominant 
religious conversion patterns of the twentieth century is that of the unaffiliated, who 
largely exited from Christianity within Western liberal democracies.139  Though the share 
of the unaffiliated largely consisted in the West within the past century, the share of the 
unaffiliated is now predominant in the Asia Pacific region, accounting for 76.2% of the 
global total.140 The rise of the ‘nones’ or the unaffiliated is a dominant current trend 
whose cultural and social impacts in the near global future have yet to be discerned. 
Typically identified with political and cultural values that are considered liberal, and at 
times characterized with assertive, anti-religious attitudes, the growth or decline of the 
unaffiliated matters for the ongoing development and negotiation between the public and 
private sphere.  
The unaffiliated is a measure for secularization. Atheists have no religious belief, 
nor religious practice, and no religious self-identification, while agnostics typically assert 
that knowledge of a deity’s existence or of a fundamental, transcendent order of ultimate 
reality is impossible or always remains uncertain for human ascertainment. Agnostics in 
particular are often noted to in fact to have some kind of religious belief, such as in the 
afterlife, or they may partake in some kind of religious practice that is spiritualistic in its 
nature (Zen, Yoga, Tarot, etc.). Yet, notwithstanding these possible religious beliefs and 
                                                        
139 See Brian J. Grim and Todd Johnson, The World’s Religions in Figures: An 
Introduction to Religious Demography, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). 
 
140 See The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the 





practices that the agnostics may or may not have, their own purported self-identification 
of not belonging to any religion indicates secularization for two reasons: the loss of 
religious authority and the de-institutionalization of religion through their own 
particularized, individualization variation of religion. Indeed, Mark Chaves maintains 
that, “Secularization is most productively understood not as declining religion, but as the 
declining scope of religious authority.” 141 
 What are the main drivers of religious disaffiliation? To leave one’s own 
religion—and religion is largely an affair of familial inheritance—is a conversion in the 
sense of transitioning to a new self-identity and worldview. Conversion by way of 
disaffiliation is a measure of secularization, and this trend of conversion particularly 
captivates the modern West. In his work Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation, 
anthropologist Henri Gooren takes throughout his work the orienting question: “What is it 
that makes people religiously active?”.142 In analyzing the main drivers of religious 
disaffiliation, this question can perhaps be reframed as: What is it that makes people 
actively non-religious? It is my assumption that both questions are in mutual relation at 
the basic dimensions of existential or religious human experience.  
Religion and Secularization 
Secularization and the unaffiliated is a characteristic question of religion and modernity. 
The central question in defining religion is important, for as Mark Chaves notes, “how 
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religion is understood determines secularization theory’s direction”143 Indeed, the 
‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ are in a dydadic relation that mutually constitutes each other 
in meaning.  
Current scholarship in religious studies recognizes that there are inherent 
difficulties and limitations in defining the concept of ‘religion’ because of its direct 
relation to the concept of ‘secular’. Ancient Roman use of the Latin word religio was 
used to describe moral and social obligations in society, and in this sense religio 
primarily signified the bond or cohesion of social order, and not necessarily theological 
beliefs in gods or supernatural deities. It is also noted by Wilfred Cantwell Smith that the 
ancient civilizations of Greece, Egypt, Aztecs, India, Japan and China did not contain a 
word that was equivalent or approximated in the modern use of the word ‘religion’. In 
medieval Western Christendom, religio developed to signify and distinguish the clergy 
who took part within orders, as opposed to diocesan or ‘secular’ clergy, thus the split 
between what is considered ‘religion’ and what is considered ‘secular’ was first 
initialized as a Roman Catholic theological differentiation. 
Scholars recognize that the current, modern usage of the term ‘religion’, much 
like the modern usage of its counterpart ‘secular’, is only around two hundred years old 
and developed within the distinctive political and social configurations of the birth of the 
modern West.144 The definition of ‘religion’ in modernity, as William Cavanaugh points 
out, signified  
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a universal genus of which the various religions are species; each religion comes 
to be demarcated by a system of propositions; religion is identified with an 
essentially interior, private impulse; and religion comes to be seen as essentially 
distinct from secular pursuits such as politics, economics, and the like. 145 
 
This separation between what is conceptualized as ‘religion’ and what is conceptualized 
as ‘secular’ has remained the central foundation for contemporary theories of religion, 
which can categorically be divided into two approaches of essentialism or functionalism. 
The essentialist approach tends to define religion through the primary characteristic of 
beliefs and doctrines on God(s), spirits or what is called ‘transcendence’, while the 
functionalist approach defines religion through the role that religion plays within society 
in fulfilling individual and communal needs, such as expressed in communal practices, 
rituals and observances. 
However, the modern definition of religion is under sustained criticism, 
particularly with the attempt to identify religion as an immutable, transhistorical and 
transcultural essence that is “waiting to be separated from the secular like a precious 
metal from its ore”.146  Establishing a universal definition for ‘religion’ is problematic in 
that, as Johnson and Grim observe, “there cannot be a universal definition of society and 
culture –they are constantly changing, and religion changes with them.”147 Further, the 
complexity of religion changing in tandem with society also expands the definition of 
religion to seemingly account for almost any kind of belief or practice within society. As 
historian of religion scholar Jonathan Z Smith points out, by as early as 1912 James 
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Leuba’s Psychological Study of Religion cites over fifty definitions of religion in the 
appendix, which gives the impression that the term “religion” is either indefinable or 
expansive enough to be able include over fifty definitions. This complexity of defining 
religion has led Smith to famously remark that “…there is no data for religion. Religion 
is solely the creation of the scholars study…Religion has no existence apart from the 
academy.”148 
Despite these limitations to defining religion, it can be said that religion involves 
a combination of beliefs, practices, and self-identification to a community or institution 
that is  
based on the existence of supernatural deities with powers of agency (that is, 
Gods) or impersonal processes possessed of moral purpose (the Hindu and 
Buddhist notion of karma, for example) that set the conditions of, or intervene in, 
human affairs.149  
 
Religious self-identification serves as way to measure secularization. 
On The Secular 
Each of the words “secular”, “secularism”, and “secularization” contain certain 
connotations that should be distinguished when the question of religion and modernity is 
raised, so as to not confuse the descriptive account of secularization from a normative 
account of secularism. The core term “secular” serves as an imaginative, theoretical 
construct de-limiting what is sacred (religious) from what is mundane (natural), and is 
conceived as a “natural” order of space and time that remains when one peels away the 
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super-structure of what is conceived as “religion”. “Secularism” is a comprehensive 
doctrine or political ideology that is manifest in the worldview of secular humanism or 
atheism, as well as in policies such as separation between state and religion for the 
purpose for either passively tolerating religion or actively controlling religion (Kuru 
2007), as well as in aggressive state atheism as seen in the Communist era. The process 
of secularization need not assume the comprehensive doctrine or ideology of secularism. 
Secularization and its Discontents 
“Secularization” can be analytically conceptualized in two ways: a) “the theory of the 
institutional differentiation of the so-called secular spheres, such as state, economy, and 
science, from the religious institutions and norms” b) “the theory of the progressive 
decline of religious beliefs and practices as a concomitant of levels of modernization”.150 
Thus, secularization occurs in the realm of public space and in the realms private belief 
and practice.  
Modernization is the process through which agrarian pre-industrial societies 
transition to industrial technological societies and eventually to post-industrial, 
information societies.151 The differentiation and specialization of institutions through the 
transformations of the economy is made possible through the central agency of 
technology. Modernization can further be characterized as growth within the sectors of 
health, income and education, which are central indicators of the concept of human 
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development. The theory of modernization is that socioeconomic development produces 
and to some extent predicts shifts and changes in political and cultural values.  
The thesis of secularization is that religion loses it influence and social 
significance through these transitions of modern, human development.152 Jurgen 
Habermas observes that advocates of the secularization thesis maintain that progressive, 
human development within societies leads to higher levels  
of welfare and greater social security; and with a reductions of risks in life, and 
the ensuing increase in existential security, there is a drop in the personal need for 
a practice that promises to cope with uncontrolled contingencies through faith in a 
'higher' or cosmic power.153  
 
Technology is central to this interpretation, which gives humans a sense of the mastery 
over their own fate and control over both the forces of nature and the onset of death. With 
technology, sociologist David Martin writes that “the general sense of human power is 
increased, the play of contingency is restricted, and the overwhelming sense of divine 
limits which afflicted previous generations is much diminished.”154 Divine providence is 
displaced with human ingenuity and technological power, and in this sense secularization 
occurs through the existential security provided through the advances of technology 
brought with modernization.  
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Yet, for over more than a decade, the secularization thesis has undergone 
thoroughgoing critique from various fields of academic discourse. What many perceive to 
be the failure of secularization theory is that it is too general, universal, reductionist, 
Western centric, and more often than not triumphalist.  
Through what is called the “resurgence of religion”, the “post-secular”, and 
“multiple modernities”, many argue that religion endures and even grows through the 
process of modernization. The United States is often cited as a paradigmatic illustration 
of the conjunction between religious growth and modernization. Robert D. Putnam and 
David E. Cambell show through their data that it is the well educated of the United States 
who fill the church pews, and that religion is “increasingly the ‘opiate the affluent’, while 
secularization seems to be proceeding more rapidly among less educated Americans.”155  
In one historical and sociological analysis based on estimates of church membership, 
Rodney Stark and Roger Finke found that about 17% of Americans belonged to a church 
in 1776, and grew to about 62% in 1980, in what they call the “churching” of America.156 
As a thoroughly modern nation born on the secularized premise of the separation between 
church and state, America is considered a strong bastion of high religious affiliation and 
vitality.  
 From a global perspective, Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott and Timothy 
Shah maintain that “the demographic center of gravity of many religious communities 
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continues to shift from an impoverished, illiterate, and rural mass to an emerging and 
increasingly sophisticated middle class…”,157 and from this educated class many 
religious actors are able to mobilize growth within religious communities. Indeed, the 
current discussion and revisions of the secularization thesis has moved forward into what 
are called “post-secular” societies, which are characterized with a burgeoning mutual 
adjustment between both the religious and secular communities, and where religion 
continues to maintain a public influence and social significance in light of the advances 
of secularization. What Jose Casanova calls the “de-privatization” of religion and its 
current vibrancy within the public sphere in terms of global civil society, its salient 
visibility through religious immigrants within condensed urban cityscapes, the sweeping 
evangelistic efforts of missionary organizations, and transnational networks of radical 
religious terrorism has brought reconsideration as to how shared citizenship between the 
religious and the non-religious is possible in modern secular societies.158 Many examples 
abound of the resurgence of religion, such as the Iranian Revolution, the Moral Majority 
of the United States, 9/11, the emergence of global religious terrorists networks, the 
BNJP Party in India, the fall of communism in Poland under the religious actor of Pope 
John Paul II, the Orthodox revival in Russia, the vast growth of Pentecostalism in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the underground Christian churches in China, 
and the notable growth of Buddhism in Western societies. Peter Berger, once the 
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foremost advocates of secularization theory in the 1960’s, famously recanted his earlier 
prediction of the demise of religion,  
The world today, with some exceptions, is as furiously religious as it ever was, 
and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature 
by historians and social scientists loosely labeled secularization theory is 
essentially mistaken.159 
 
The exception for Berger is Europe, where religious decline continues unabated. 
Another objection to the thesis of secularization is that that religion does not 
decline through modernization but rather changes or transforms. Certain agnostics who in 
fact have some type of religious belief are offered as evidence of the constant demand for 
religion and demonstrates that the vitality of religion still remains with us, albeit in a new 
modernized, contemporary expression (i.e. Yoga, spiritualist practices, meditation, votive 
candle lighting, astrology, etc.) The exiting of religion from its organized, institutional 
formation is an outcome of what Charles Taylor calls the “nova effect”, in which the 
dynamic of religion continues through transformation and change.  Particularly within 
Western liberal democracies since the 1960’s, contemporary religion takes on an 
egalitarian form of expressive individualism. This transformation or change in religious 
expression can be defined as New Religions or contemporary, alternative spirituality. The 
identity of these ‘movements’ is porous and indeterminate, and its adherents are often 
characterized within descriptive phrasing such as ‘spiritual but not religious’, ‘fuzzy 
fidelity’, ‘unchurched believers’, ‘believing without belonging’, or are located within the 
conceptual space of ‘liminality’. Charles Taylor, in his monumental work A Secular Age, 
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considers these modern expressions of religion as a derivative of the ‘ethics of 
authenticity’ “in which people are encouraged to find their own way, discover their own 
fulfillment, ‘do their own thing’.”160 At its most extreme form, Robert Bellah has termed 
this transformation of religion as “Sheilaism”, where religion consists entirely of 
individualized, interiorized expression.161 
However, demographers Todd Johnson and Brian Grim do not find there to be a 
global resurgence in religion: “In 1910 the world was home to very few atheists and 
agnostics. By 2010, they numbered in the hundreds of millions and represented 11.8% of 
the human population.”162 The United States, which stands as the example of 
modernization in conjunction with religious vitality, is experiencing the highest 
percentages of the unaffiliated within the history of the Pew Centers polling, which saw 
an increase from roughly 15% to slightly below 20% within the past five years. And 
despite the objection which describes modern religion as change but not decline, or as the 
‘nova effect’ of the new individualized religious experience, it can be argued that 
alternative expressions of religion is a syndrome of secularization insofar as it manifests 
the de-institutionalization of religion and the loss of religious authority through 
individualization of religious beliefs. These contemporary expressions of religions can be 
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characterized as “earthly desires for health, meaning, and wellbeing rather than a 
connection to the supernatural.”163 Further, the growth of these movements is minimal, 
and not strong enough to replace the exit of adherents to Christendom in Western 
societies, where much of the ‘nova effect’ is occurring. Lastly, these movements by the 
very fact of being individuated perhaps lack the social cohesion and mechanisms 
necessary to produce sustained growth in religion in generations to come. The loss of 
social cohesion is one of the major components of Olivier Roy’s notion of deculturation. 
The Relation of Modernization to Religion 
What the recent critique of the secularization thesis makes clear is that though the 
concept of modernization is central to secularization and religious conversion, the effect 
of modernization on religion is varied, and must take into account regional, cultural, and 
historical variation of the particular societies concerned. Rodney Stark and Roger Finke 
maintain that, “What is needed is not a simple minded theory of inevitable religious 
decline, but a theory to explain variation.”164 Also, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart 
clarify that “secularization is a tendency and not an iron law.”165 The process of 
secularization can stall and be reversed through high fertility rates of the religious over 
against the low fertility rates of secular cohorts, and as well through religious 
conversions. Adapting the thesis of secularization to include variation and to consist as a 
tendency, there are several key, large-scale processes and effects of modernization on 
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religion that are to be considered with the question of religious disaffiliation. 
Modernization understood as pluralization and as human development creates the 
ecological conditions necessary in which the trends of religious disaffiliation occurs. 
I argue that the Main Drivers for Religious Disaffiliation are 
• Pluralization (Choice) 
• Human Development (Existential Security and Individualized Autonomy) 
Religious Diversity, Pluralism and the Democratic Condition 
Peter Berger writes that,  
There is no great mystery about the causes of modern pluralism – these are the 
classical process of modernization – urbanization, migration, mass education, the 
mass media of communication, all of these gaining additional potency under 
democratic conditions…166  
 
Religious diversity, a necessary pre-requisite of pluralization, is distinct from 
religious pluralism in its definition. Religious diversity is a characteristic of demography 
measured by inter- or intra-religious population grouping under a specific religion 
(Christianity, Baptists, Islam, Suffi, Hindu, etc.), whereas pluralization or pluralism is a 
philosophical or political project that necessitates a civic engagement with religious 
diversity for the purpose of achieving a shared civil society through mutual understanding 
of one’s values and religious commitments based on shared dialogue.167  
The effects of modernization on religion that enables the diversification and 
pluralization of religious bodies and institutions is through the modern processes of 
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globalization (communications, transnational migrations, information) and 
democratization (political conditions). Globalization and democratization makes possible 
the conditions for religious diversification and pluralization.  
1) Globalization: Modern technological advances within transportation and 
communication creates a global network of transnational migration and initializes a vast 
dissemination of information to the public. This ‘globalization’ of people and ideas 
circulates religious beliefs, practices and communities, and therefore increases religious 
diversity and a sense of transnational solidarity with imaginary religious communities, 
such as seen with the Islamic ummah. Within this global circulation of the varieties of 
religion an ecological climate for religious conversions and disaffiliation is created. 
2) Democratization: The modern project of pluralism is maintained and advanced 
through the presence and growth of liberal democracies. The political condition and 
cultural climate that is engendered is one of religious tolerance and/or a common, global 
civil society that incorporates religion into the public square. Democratization is 
concomitant with the expansion of the philosophical doctrine and legal formulation of 
human rights, which is codified in relation to religion in Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that:  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in teaching, practice, worship and observance.  
 
The political conditions of liberal democracy and freedom of religion substantiates a 
religious atmosphere of pluralism and creates religious markets in which competition 




Human Development and Risk 
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart hypothesize in The Sacred and Secular (2011) that 
“feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal and personal risks are a key factor directly 
driving religiosity.”168 They argue that socio-economic development increases levels of 
existential human security, and that “the core idea of security denotes freedom from 
various risks and dangers”169 which can bring the onset of premature death. Risks include 
not only military threats but also “environmental degradation to natural and manmade 
disasters and floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, and droughts, as well as the threat of disease 
epidemics, violations of human rights, humanitarian crisis, and poverty.”170 Overall, what 
is not so important is the specific nature of the risks, but rather what is being risked, 
namely human life, which makes human security equivalent to existential security. Once 
people are lifted out of these vulnerable positions towards risks, and adequate levels of 
socioeconomic development are in place, there is a tendency to secularization. Again, 
Norris and Inglehart clarify secularization in terms of tendency and probability, and not 
as some iron law of determinism.  
The analysis of Norris and Ingelheart bears direct relation to the consensus within 
sociological literature, where high levels of human insecurity are associated with high 
levels of religiosity; conversely, high levels of human security are associated with 
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reductions in religiosity.  Anthony Gill and Erik Lundsgaarde found that with increase in 
government welfare spending there corresponds a reduction in religious participation.171 
Rachel M. MCleary and Robert J. Barro support through a cross-country analysis the 
hypothesis that economic development tends to decreases religiosity.172  In a multi-level 
analysis of religious attendance within 60 countries, Stijn Ruiter and Frank van Tubergen 
found that religious attendance is increased by personal (existential) and societal 
(economic) insecurities.173 Scandinavia is a particularly acute case of low religiosity and 
high government welfare spending.174 Ekrem Karakoc and Birol Baskan found that 
“economic inequality increases the positive evaluation of the role of religion in politics 
through its effect on religiosity and participation in religious organizations.”175 And based 
on data from four rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2007-2008) on 26 
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European countries, Tim Immerzeel and Frank van Tubergen were also able to maintain 
and further develop the human insecurity hypothesis.176 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARTS 
The following demograpic charts are ones that I developed at the International Instittue of 
Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, in which I correlate secularization with 
human development. I use the concept of human development as my proxy for 
modernization. In these charts I took demographic data from the World Religion 
Database, and measured the secular cohort from across all world regions alongside the 
Human Development Index from the United Nations.  
 
Figure 1. A Global Snapshot: Historical Cross Section of the Share of Unaffiliated 
with the UN Human Development Index in 2010 
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Source: World Religion Database and UN Human Development Index 
Overall in 2010, as in shown in the chart above, the global regions that rank lowest on the 
Human Development Index have the lowest percentage of the Unaffiliated, while the 
regions that rank highest on the Human Development Index have the higher share of the 
Unaffiliated. Western liberal democracies and post-Communist countries are 
characterized with high percentages of the unaffiliated, and therefore secularization. In 
particular the outliers of the post-communist countries of Estonia and Czech Republic 








Figure 2. Demographic Measure of Europe with the HDI 
In the chart above,  I took demographic data from World Religion Database, and 
measured the secular cohort of the European region (consisting of all E.U. countries) 
alongside the Human Development Index from the United Nations. The Human 
Development Index served as a proxy for the means of modernization. The percentage of 





























Figure 3. Demographic Measure of the United States of America with the HDI 
In the chart that is shown above,  I took demographic data from World Religion 
Database, and measured the secular cohort of the region of North America alongside the 
Human Development Index from the United Nations. The Human Development Index 
served as a proxy for the means of modernization. The percentage of the Unaffiliated 




Figure 4. Demographic Measure of North America with Secondary Education 
Here in the chart above I measured secondary education levels with the secular cohort of 
the Unaffiliated. Education serves as a proxy for modernization. As the level of 
secondary education increased throughout the United States, so did secularization as 





Figure 5. Demographic Measure of Europe with Secondary Education 
In the demographic chart above, I measured secondary education levels alongside the 
secular cohort of the Unaffiliated. Education serves as a proxy for modernization. As the 
level of secondary education increased throughout the region Europe (all E.U. countries), 













Figure 6. Secondary Education by Global Region 
In the demographic chart above, I took data from IIASA that indicates Secondary 
Education or Greater measured alongside the population of each global region. Secondary 
Education, like Human Development, is a proxy for modernization. The percentage of 
Secondary Education or Greater has overall increased globally by region since the 
1960’s. Daniel Bell’s argument of the globalization of Western secular norms via mass 
media since the 1960’s, alongside the global increase of Secondary Education since the 
1960’s, underpins supports the case for further secularization in the decades to come. 
 
1) Education, Individualization and Secularization 
The spread of mass education is a concomitant of modernization, and is essential to 
economic growth and human development. Education in relation to religion is limited in 
its secularizing effects if education is understood simply within the scope of the thesis of 
rationalization, in which religion will inevitably erode through the progressive growth of 
scientific knowledge. This view of the triumph of science over religion has been 
adequately critiqued elsewhere.177 Yet, despite the limitations of the rationalization 
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thesis, education is positively correlated with secularity and the unaffiliated.178 The 
context of education should be understood within obtaining adequate levels of human 
development and existential security, thus giving education a more comprehensive role in 
secularization. Education gives the individual an “emancipative orientation”, as Ronald 
Inglehart and Christian Welzel maintain, and high levels of education stands as “an 
indicator that an individual grew up with a sufficiently high level of existential security to 
take survival for granted—and therefore gives top priority to autonomy, individual 
choice, and self-expression…”179 High levels of education assume high levels of 
existential security, thus education serves as a proxy for modernization and human 
development. Further, inasmuch as education develops intellectual independence, human 
choice and self-expression, education must be seen as a socialization process, for 
education serves as transmission for culture and values and thus is a carrier for either 
secularization or religion. Lack of education and literacy restrains and limits the choices 
that one has.  
Figure 7 & 8: Demographic Projections unto 2050 of North America and Europe 
The two charts below are Demographic Projections from the data I obtained from the 
IIASA, projecting the share of the Unaffiliated alongside Secondary Education or 
Greater. According to the projected scenarios, secularization is highly likely for the 
regions of both Europe and North America unto 2050, around the time that fertility rates 
in the West are projected to drop precipitously. The data I use overall supports Olivier 
Roy’s theory of deculturation and secularization. 
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The Culminative effect of Human Development as Modernization upon Religion 
 
Modernization both secularizes and pluralizes, while pluralization increases the 
opportunity for religious disaffiliation.180  And the central component of religious 
disaffiliation is choice. Johnson and Grim point out,  
One salient feature of pluralistic societies is the greater possibility of religious 
choice: an individual is no longer tied to the religion of his parents or country or 
birth if adherents of the world’s religions surround him in his own backyard.181 
 
The choices within the globalized spiritual market place offer a break from the natural 
bond that ties the children with the religion of their parents and country. Such a break due 
to choice is what is meant by deculturation. Furthermore, as human development 
continues within western societies, alternative choices that offer varieties of 
secularization continue to expand. Amartya Sen, in his article “Development as 
Capability Expansion” argued that the standards and quality of life given to us through 
human development should be seen as “human capabilities”. 182  Human capabilities 
refers to the opportunities that a person has to exercise his or her “freedom to attain 
different kinds of alternative lives between which a person can choose”.183 The increase 
of human development increases the opportunity of choice, which therefore increases the 
opportunity for religious disaffiliation. 
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With growth in human development and increase in existential security, there is a 
loss in the social significance and demand for religion. With increase in religious 
diversification (globalization) and pluralization (liberal democracy), religion is no longer 
taken for granted in the domain of moral authority and certainty, which makes religion 
more a matter of individual choice when the conditions of religious inheritance and belief 
are relativized. Modernization, described as human development, in conjunction with the 
pluralization brought the globalization, has strong secularizing effect on religious faith, 
and a deculturating effect on religious tradition. As Branas-Garza, Munoz, and Neuman 
conclude in their “Determinants of Disaffiliation: An International Study” that, 
Our data advocate that indeed there is a clear strong correlation between religious 
pluralism of a country and the tendency of its population to convert out and 
abandon any religious affiliation…we find clear evidence in favor of the demand 
side, sociological approaches: a greater diversity does not stimulate greater 
religious participation, but rather secularization and disaffiliation.(Branas-Garza, 




Definition of Religious Conversion 
Conversion can be defined as a “comprehensive change of religious worldview and 
identity, based on self-report and on the report of others”.184 Conversion always implies a 
movement from an identity or perspective towards another identity or perspective. Lewis 
Rambo describes conversion as “a process of religious change that takes place in a 
dynamic force field of people, events, ideologies, institutions, expectations, and 
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orientations.”185 This developmental process set within the stages of the life cycle and 
particularly within adolescence and adulthood is best understood within conversion 
motifs or what Henri Gooren calls a “conversion career”.186 Self-identification is largely 
an ongoing discovery, and individuals may often revert back to a former identity or 
further change into another identity. In a sense, identity stays in a perpetual state of 
transition. In order to capture the full complexity of the meaning and comprehensiveness 
of conversion one must necessarily involve interdisciplinary research from the fields of 
developmental psychology, anthropology, sociology, religion and theology. Each 
discipline covers necessary aspects of the conversion process of the individual, from the 
interior process of critical thinking or religious problem solving, the cultural aspect of 
belonging and of habits of ritual and belonging, institutional factors of evangelization and 
charismatic, religious actors, and not least the often neglected aspect of the 
religious/theological.  
Religious Conversion and Self-Identity 
For the purpose of demography, the scope of conversion is limited to “switching”, which 
is the transition of “self-identification” between religious traditions. This says nothing of 
religious vitality and intensity, and it remains opaque on the specific beliefs and values 
embraced by the individuals. For instance, one may identify as a Muslim, but we know 
not whether in fact that individual is in fact an agnostic, but chooses to identify for the 
purpose of cultural belonging or because of government restrictions that would judicially 
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penalize a religious conversion. Current academic discourse speaks of the hybridization 
of religious identity, due to the compressing forces and transnational process of 
globalization that challenges the traditional form of binary, taxonomic classification.187 
The cultural effect of hybridization allows for the porous and liminal identity of both/and, 
while pluralization also brings about the possibility for ‘multiple religious belonging’, 
‘double belonging’, or ‘hyphenated religious identity’. For instance, one can be a 
Buddhist Jew or an Agnostic Muslim, an Atheist Hindu and even a Muslim -Christian.188 
Creolisation, hybridity and syncretism marks the new age of deculturated religion. What 
characterizes religion within modernity is that one individualizes their own religious 
beliefs by choosing from whichever religious tradition that suites one’s own particular 
lifestyle and worldview. This type of individualized piecemeal of religion is an instance 
of Roy’s theory of deculturation.  
 
Conversion Theory and Disaffiliation 
Conversion theory is a century old endeavor, however the question of religious 
disaffiliation or what some call apostasy/defection to non-religion is of recent importance 
due to the growth of the unaffiliated and the continued decline of religious attendance and 
membership in Western, liberal democracies.189 If taking Gooren’s orienting question of 
What is it that makes people religiously active?, then What is that makes people actively 
non-religious? is the orienting question that I employ for religious disaffiliation and 
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modernity.  While taking into consideration all the factors of the large-scale processes 
and effects of modernity—mass communications, transnational migration, mass 
education, human development, pluralization, religious diversification—the thread of 
existential security and education within theories of religious (de) conversion is of central 
importance. 
Theories of Conversion: Religion as Coping Mechanism 
The birth of conversion theory is wedded with the birth of the psychology of religion, for 
the first question of the convert is satisfied through the dialectic of an interior, 
psychological resolution. Beginning with the North American psychologist Edwin Diller 
Starbuck, who inquired into American rural religious revival through empirical and 
statistical methods with his The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Study of the 
Growth of Religious Consciousness (1899). Starbuck was the first to situate the 
phenomena of religious conversion primarily within the age cycle of adolescence, a thesis 
that still stands largely unchallenged in current literature within sociology and 
psychology. His work carried over and was heavily referenced with William James 
classic The Varieties of Religious Experience (1901), which maintains the same thesis of 
adolescence as the initiating period of conversion. James develops the theme of the crisis 
period of conversion, in which acutely felt compunctions and existential tensions lead to 
a divided self, thus in the act of conversion “the process, gradual or sudden, by which a 
self hitherto divided…becomes unified.” It is here at the tension of the individual, the 
modern experience of the crisis of secularism, and the inability of the immanent frame to 
offer a fullness of comprehensive doctrine for many individuals within the West to 
convert to stricter forms of religious communities and stronger forms of religiosity. 
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Individuals radicalize when the tensions of poverty and the metanarrative of liberal 
democracies fail to give a reason to continue a full existence within the immanent frame. 
Globalization, Deculturation and Religious Conversion 
Secularization and human development correlate. Because of such, the West will 
continue to secularize and remain secular, and there will be a strong tendency towards 
religious disaffiliation. The increase in secularization and pluralization within the West 
will exacerbate the political and cultural differences between secular and religious 
cohorts through the deculturation of religion. Further, extreme poverty levels and 
existential insecurity that the globalized, neoliberal capitalistic practices are creating 
within the global south and non-western societies has the opposite effect of generating 
high levels of religiosity. High levels of global mass immigration from these non-
Western societies into Europe and other Westernized societies creates the uptick of the 
apparent return of religion, which in the secular public sphere appears vibrant due to their 
commitment towards religious practices and high levels of religiosity. In this sense, 
globalization is both a main driver of secularization in the West, and the main driver of 
religiosity within the global south, MENA and other non-western societies. Globalization 
operates as a duel edged sword. 
There are several observations to be made with Olivier Roy’s theory of 
deculturation and religious conversion. What is to note that those who secularize by 
becoming religiously unaffiliated, and those who sacralize by embracing religious faith 
no longer do so from a top down political apparatus of enforced imperialism. Both 
secuarlization and sacralization have become within our cultural climate a matter of 
individual choice and optionality. What Olivier Roy points out is that conversions of 
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sacralization and secularization are “massive, individual and multidirectional.” As Roy 
writes,  
As far as the history of Christianity is concerned, mass conversions were largely 
linked to political domination, from the barbarians of the late Roman Empire to 
the Amerindians and Africans of the colonial period. Conversions to Islam used to 
occur inside the Muslim kingdoms and empires mostly as a way to align with the 
dominant power…In a word, conversions worked vertically from the dominant to 
dominants, as if the top were some type of magnet attracting subjects.190  
  
Religious conversion has always been a matter of politics, and the concern was to 
maintain a political order between state and religion through either suppression of the 
bourgeoning religious faiths or through their acculturation, territorialisation and 
assimilation by the political powers that be. But to understand conversions merely within 
the framework of political domination and imperialism is to understand conversions as a 
matter of mere culture. Culture is reduced to religion, and religion is reduced to culture 
within this operative framework. Yet, religious or secular conversions today do not 
consist of the appropriation of culture, but rather the quest for identity and the pure 
system and practice of an absolute and universal faith. Because of the deculturated nature 
contemporary conversions, Roy argues that “conversions contribute to the 
destructuration/modernization process of traditional societies.”191 
Roy observes that the shift of conversion from religion as culture towards the 
separation and sundering of religion from culture begins with the so-called return of 
religion that took place since the 1960’s, which was the rise of fundamentalism as well as 
the rise of the age of authenticity. Roy points out that, “Contemporary conversions look 
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for the ‘purely religious’ and entail the constitution of ‘faith communities’ that, even 
when they do not sever their ties with the surrounding society, insist on being purely 
religious.”192 The religious switching that occurs between Islam towards Christianity, or 
from Christianity towards Islam, or from either of these towards a more radical versions 
of the either, such as towards Salafism or towards Pentecostalism, is not a matter of a 
trend towards a return towards civilizational religion, but rather to religion in its purest 
form, that of deculturated religion. In the fundamentalist version of deculturation, 
religious tradition is rejected for not being orthodox enough. In the liberalized form of 
deculturation, religious tradition is jettisoned for being too orthodox.  
What we are witnessing in contemporary religion and transformation are massive 
individual conversions premised on religious choice and optionality, rather than massive 
group conversions that made the bulk of conversions within historical terms. 
Individualized and deculturated conversions therefore serve to undermine cohesive 
political identity and collective social identity. Modern converts are also antithetical to 
inculturated, nominal religion. Modern converts are characterized with religious zeal that 
appears as an odd, exotic, phenomena within the backdrop of secularized public square. 
The embrace of a pure and zealous faith, which stands against nominalist version of 
cultural religious affiliation, characterizes deculturated religion. The true believers 
separate themselves from the lukewarm affiliates and the non-believers, inasmuch as the 
true believers separate themselves from culture. The convert rejects the concept of 
‘religion’ as consisting of dead orthodoxy. The fundamentalist rejects ‘religion’ because 
it veered away from the ‘true faith’ of strict absolute orthodoxy, in which the 
                                                        
192 Ibid., 176. 
  
 107
fundamentalist has recovered through his abstracted appropriation of the sacred text. The 
liberal rejects ‘religion’ because it veered away from the ‘true faith’ of inclusivity that 
has been layered with patriarchal and violent traditions.  
Religious conversions were once a project of empire and colonization But with 
globalization, we are now post-civilizing mission, though we are not post-empire. For 
globalization is empire. As Roy writes, 
it is clear that globalization today is an extension of colonialism and that the 
debate about values (human rights, democracy, women’s rights) is also a debate 
about power (illustrated by the ‘right to intervene’ and the development of a 
forceful humanitarian sector, the worthy successor of the nineteenth-century 
foreign missions) The impact of globalization, like that of colonialism, goes way 
beyond issues of power and alienation, and that is what interests us.193  
 
But this empire is an unwitting force for religious conversion and secularization through 
the force of deculturation. Globalization secularizes, and globalization creates religious 
fundamentalism, but it does so as an inadvertent process. Globalization is an empire that 
creates religious revival and religious conversion as an unintended consequence of its 
secularization. It is a secularization that aims, in paradox manner, to retain religious 
freedom and the right to convert religious faith, but by doing so through the legal concept 
of human rights, we are given the condition of pluralization, which is itself a secularizing 
factor. 
The conversions we see today are ‘born-again’ conversions, ones that consist of 
“a sudden individual break with the past and a re-assertion of religion as an absolute faith 
                                                        




with little or no concession to the profane culture”.194  Roy points out, that “Evangelicals 
in the USA, Salafis in Egypt, Haredim in Israel”, are examples of religious communities 
that breakaway from the apparent liberalism and corruption of their affiliated religious 
cohorts. Conversions are a product of deculturation, and conversions are an agent of 
deculturation.  Like globalization, conversions are a duel edged sword. 
In the final analysis, Olivier Roy makes the case of Holy Ignorance for the 
religious convert:  
The convert puts forward something that could not be understood in sociological 
terms: faith as a primary, not as an element among others constituting a religious 
identity…. A sociological approach cannot exhaust the experiences and agency of 
the converts. There is autonomy of the religious sphere that social sciences have a 
problem grasping.195  
 
The religious convert, the true believer, the deculturated religion consists in faith in the 
absolute, in the transcendent, and the universal. This kind of faith cannot be reduced to 
reason, to culture, and to any other symbolic system. This is the kind of universal and 
absolute faith that the sociologist and anthropologist fails to grasp.
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Chapter 4. What is the Post-Secular? 
The post-secular consists of an uncertain state of enduring tension. The post-secular is a 
direct output of the resurgence or return of religion. As I argued in the previous chapters, 
the so-called “resurgence” of world religion is the purported critical religious trend of the 
beginning of the 21st century, one that is made possible through the conditions of 
globalization, democratization, and modernization. The thesis of secularization – that 
religion inexorably loses social significance through the transitions of modernization – no 
longer stands as the uncontested, dominant paradigm of religion within political and 
social theory. Peter Berger famously wrote just shortly before 9/11 that  
The world today, with some exceptions…is as furiously religious as it ever was, 
and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature 
by historians and social scientists loosely labeled secularization theory is 
essentially mistaken.196  
 
But this is not necessarily the case, at least within the West, according to Olivier Roy. For 
Roy, secularization has won out in the West, while globalization continues to deculturate 
religion in non-Western societies. Religion, separated from culture through the process of 
secularization, transforms into the experience of subjective and individuated experience 
of religiosity. Deculturated religion is individuated religion. For Roy, the secularization 
thesis still stands a recognizable force of societal change, albeit with certain 
modifications to be made regarding the process.  
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Roy argues that through deculturation, the post-secular is a state of permanent 
tension because there is no longer a middle ground in which a common consensus can 
emerge within the public square. The religious and the non-religious no longer share 
common values. Deculturation de-traditionalizes and de-contextualizes religion, 
transforming religion into religiosities that are either fundamentalized or liberalized. 
Religion becomes radicalized further and further into extremes, breaking consensus 
within the debates upon religion in the public square. What I argue in this chapter is that 
there is no longer a common ground between secular and sacred values that can offer 
theoretical moral framework to achieve a consensus towards human flourishing with a so 
called post-secular public sphere. This is due to deculturation, which leads to an 
exclusive humanist anthropology based on reason versus a sacred anthropology based on 
revelation. 
Defining, Understanding and Describing the Post-Secular 
The new theory of the post-secular is a consequence of the criticism of the theory of the 
secular. The theory of secularization has come under criticism for various reasons. Ulrich 
Beck points out that,  
Secularization theory is based on two assumptions: first, that modernization as it 
emerged in the European context (Max Weber called it ‘occidental rationality’ a 
century ago) is a universal process which leads to similar developments all over 
the world; and, second, secularization is inseparable from modernization and is as 
irresistible.197 
 
Both assumptions have since been jettisoned. Secularization is not a universal and 
uniform teleological process that proceeds as an iron law, nor is it necessarily hinged to 
                                                        




modernization, as modernization can breed high levels of religiosity. Does modernization 
increase or decrease levels of religiosity? For theorists such as Berger, such a question is 
now outdated and misplaced. Berger wants to shift the discussion to pluralization, not 
secularization. Peter Berger writes that, “While secularity is not a necessary consequence 
of modernization, I would argue that pluralism is.”198 Pluralization is the paradigm that 
emerges in the discourse of the post-secular. But as I argued in my previous Chapter 3: 
Analysis of Religion, Conversion and Secularization, it is pluralization itself that is a part 
of the secularization process through its relativizing discourse, and through the 
fragilization of the religious beliefs that it creates within the religious consciousness of 
the believers. Faith is made fragile through religious diversity. Contra Peter Berger, 
Olivier Roy maintains that globalization is still able to maintain secularization insofar as 
globalization pluralizes through deculturated religion. 
The failure of certain assumptions of the classical use of secularization theory has led 
the emergence of new theories of the post-secular. And the multivalent use of the concept 
secular has led to the multivalent use of the post-secular. Benjamin Schewel claims that 
part of the complexity and ambiguity of the concept of the post-secular is that it builds on 
the concept of the secular, which itself has various uses, myriad employments and 
multiple connotations. Schewel writes, “How, then, can we think meaningfully about 
what comes after the secular when we are not even sure what the secular entails?”199 
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Notwithstanding this observation, Schewel proceeds to identify at least seven different 
approaches to post-secular discourse. 
1. Secularization theory has tended to be overly simplistic. “The process of 
secularization is more complex than classical secularization theory envisioned” 
(50) Despite what was problematic with classic secularization theory, namely, that 
modernization inherently implied or determined secularization, post-secular 
theorists point out that “ the forces identified by secularization are not necessarily 
dead or gone.” (51) 
2. Secularization theory is an accurate account for European history but lacks 
explanatory effect for current development in non-Western societies.  
“Secularization theory accurately describes a certain limited phase of modern 
history but fails to make sense of recent global transformations” (51) The post-
secular recognizes the disrupting impact that globalization has on the process of 
secularization, by making possible the condition through technology and 
migration the circulation and support of religious practice and belief. 
3. “Secularization theory actually describes part of a broader process of religious 
decline and renewal” (52) This refers to macro cyclical theories of religious 
renewal and decline, that every decline is followed by renewal in some form, 
which then inevitably leads to decline and finally decadence, from which a 
renewal proceeds. The problem is when “secularization theorists arrive at their 
narrative by focusing on each of these periods of recoil and falsely presenting 
them as aspects of a linear process of religious decline.” (53) 
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4. “The forces identified by secularization theorists do not bring about religion’s 
marginalization and decline, but rather its transformation.” (54) Religion becomes 
new forms of religiosity, spiritual practices, re-enchantment, spirituality, 
transcendental meditation, Zen, Yoga, etc. 
5. “Secularization theory overlooks religion’s intimate involvement in modernity’s 
historical formation” (55) Schewel makes the post-secular point “that religion 
played a fundamental role in stimulating and shaping many of modernity’s most 
distinctive features”(55) and that “this fact has been systematically overlooked by 
the scholarly community”. (55) Religion played a key role in the development of 
science, natural philosophy, religious freedom, etc. 
6. “Scholarly concepts of “religion” and the “secular” have been shaped by 
secularization theory and must therefore be critiqued and reconstructed if we are 
to continue using them today.” (56) This is simply to point out that the concept of 
‘religion’ and ‘secular’ were “constructed during the modern period and were 
unduly influenced by Western projects and assumptions”(56), and because of 
such, “efforts to apply these concepts to earlier periods of history and non-
Western peoples…tend to misrepresent the reality on the ground and tacitly 
contribute to Western efforts to reconstruct the world in its own image.” (56) 
7. “Purely secular accounts of human affairs hinder our ability to navigate and 
respond to the challenges facing contemporary society” (57) Here, “the idea is 
that religion’s role in the public sphere was purposefully curtailed in order to limit 
religion’s potential to foment violent conflict, but that subsequent experience has 
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shown that keeping religion out of the public sphere hinders our ability to purse 
many important social goods.” (57) 
Schewel finds that the failure of classical secularization theory has necessitated new 
approaches to the concept of the secular, and that the seven approaches or themes that he 
identifies in the mainstream academic literature of the post-secular all work together in a 
complementary fashion as “facets of a complex whole”, with each observation or 
approach offering its own unique insight to “what comes after the secular”. Failure of 
certain aspects of secularization theory leads to the notion of the post-secular. 
Secularization, accurately understood, is the transformation of religion.  
The earliest use of the term ‘post-secular’ begins with the Catholic priest Fr. 
Andrew Greeley in 1966 with his article “After Secularity: The Neo-Gemeinschaft 
Society: A Post-Christian Postscript”. For Fr. Greeley, the post-secular referred to the 
neo-gemeinschaft Catholic communities that were forming within the larger organized 
church, and were characterized as “small, subparochial, or transparochial fellowships of 
believers which will give new depth and meaning to the collegial and functional Church 
resulting from the Vatican Council”200 When one reads the literature of the post-secular, 
one obtains “a general intuition that classical theories of secularization are insufficient to 
grasp the present state between religions and contemporary societies and/ or political 
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arrangements”, and alternatively, “a stance that there is a need, from a normative point of 
view, to find more just ways of accommodating religious claims in liberal institutions.”201  
The post-secular is therefore a contested concept that can serve as a normative or 
descriptive indicator and discourse of 21st century religion in the West. The post-secular 
can be described briefly through two interlocking claims. The first is the sociological 
claim of the resurgence or return of religion, which stands in conjunction with the second 
philosophical claim of religious toleration in light of this resurgence of increasing 
religious diversification and pluralization. De-secularization or re-enchantment of the 
West has placed the concepts of the ‘secular, secularity, secularization’ along with the 
concepts of ‘religion, religions, religious’ under critique, and in their wake we are now at 
the post-secular moment. The general scholarly consensus is that the classic 
secularization thesis—whereby modernization necessarily entails a steady, gradual, 
universal erasure of religion—has collapsed in light of overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary, that of a world that is as “furiously religious” as it ever has been.  
Of course, the question is raised if there even was disappearance of religion at all. 
The problem was not the departure of religion, but rather the awakening of the secular 
public consciousness to the recalcitrant persistence and resilience of religious practice 
that affects the public square. This reawakening of the public consciousness constitutes 
the self-reflexivity of the post-secular mindset. Jose Casanova characterizes this self-
reflexivity within what he calls the fundamental “European secular Zeitgeist” as  
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neither the naive, unreflexive secularity which accepted being without religion as 
the quasi-natural, modern condition, nor the secularist self-understanding which 
turned the particular process of European Christian secularization into a universal 
normative development for all of humanity are simply tenable, that is, can be 
simply taken for granted without questioning or reflexive elaboration any more.202  
 
It is not that religion has returned, rather, it is that we in the West have returned 
our attention to religion. According to Hans Joas—“Post-secular…doesn’t express a 
sudden increase in religiosity, after its epochal decrease, but rather a change in mindset of 
those who, previously, felt justified in considering religions to be moribund.”203 The so-
called ‘return of religion’ has created a critical self-reflexivity of the secular 
consciousness. We have transitioned into ‘post-secular’ societies, which are characterized 
by burgeoning mutual adjustment and “overlapping consensus” between the religious and 
secular communities. Religion has ostensibly returned from exile as a fully de-privatized 
enterprise, exerting notable global influence within the global public square. Global 
regions are increasingly characterized with a pluralized “religious market” of competing 
religions and contesting communities of faith. This global pluralization is framed within 
an expanding political discourse of liberal democracy and universal human rights that 
gives sacred privilege to the idea of religious freedom as codified in Article 18 of the UN 
declaration. Democratization, modernization, and globalization are generally identified as 
primary factors in the bourgeoning global religious diversity in western societies, the 
proliferation of religious visibility in the public square, the demographic growth of the 
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world’s religions, and the renegotiation of the jurisprudence, norms, and values between 
religious communities and secular cohorts. The post-secular is the attempt to achieve 
consensus between disparate religious and non-religious bodies by re-conceptualizing the 
constructed space of the secular into a space of accommodation. Post-secularism hopes to 
achieve this without sacrificing the commitment to rationality, liberal democracy, and 
universal human rights.  
The outcome of the post-secular debate is to recognize the trend of religious 
pluralism and pluralization in the public square, and by doing so this opens a space for 
coexistence, mutual adjustment, and overlapping consensus between secular cohorts and 
religious communities. Religion is given a legitimate place in public discourse alongside 
the secular. Both the secular and the religious are flourishing, rising, declining, 
developing and transforming alongside of each other. Protestant theologian Luke 
Bretherton defines the post-secular as “a period in which, for the first time, multiple 
modernities, each with their respective relationship to religious belief and practice, are 
overlapping and interacting within the same shared, predominantly urban spaces”.204 A 
post-secular society is heterogeneous, but not necessarily (though it can be) an enclave 
society; there is mutual recognition of the other within the shared public square. The 
post-secular is thereby characterized by “optionality”, in which secular beliefs, along 
with religious beliefs, are relativized, and the secular along with the religious are 
perceived as one option among many. Pluralistic societies are characterized by choice. 
The individual is no longer bound the religious bond inherited either by country, or ethnic 
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and parental affiliations, which are traditional markers of civilizational religion. 
Deculturated religion is defined by the choice of the individual.  
One must also notice the historical chronological assumption posited when 
speaking in terms of ‘post’ or ‘beyond’ or ‘after’. For instance, Vincent Geoghegan 
writes that,  
Post-secularism is a contested concept that lends itself to ambiguity. It could 
suggest a deeply antagonistic stance towards secularism, involving the call for a 
resurgent religiosity, where ‘post’ really implies ‘pre’- a dismantling of the 
secular culture of the past few centuries (see, for example, Blond 1998).205  
 
Yet, Roy would qualify this resurgent religiosity as characterized with his notion of de-
culturated religion, and not the return of civilizational religion itself, as in evidenced in 
the model of Samuel Huntington. For sociologist Craig Calhoun, he writes that “post-
secularism can hardly mean ‘after secularism’, though it might signal an end to taking it 
for granted that a clear, stable, and consistent demarcation has been established between 
secular and religious dimensions of life.”206 Here, Calhoun agrees that we have not 
reached an age in which the secular is no longer a social reality, live option or political 
fact. The temporal framework of the secular designated with the term ‘post’, does not 
mean ‘after’ secularism, such as in an established linear time frame of <pre-secular to 
secular to post-secular>. We must still reckon with and recognize secularism and 
secularity. Vincent Geoghegan gives a positive appropriation of the post-secular in that  
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“a post-secular perspective therefore betokens not a rejection of the secular, but a 
recognition that the achievements of the secular will not be lost by a more nuanced 
approach to religion. (see, for example, Martin, 1996).”207 By criticizing the imperializing 
and totalizing characteristics of harsh secular perspective, we are able to look at religion 
from different lense, a different approach and different methodology that still avails a 
secular perspective that is modified through a balanced view of the religious experience.  
It is also helpful to understand the post-secular in analogous terms of the post-
modern. It is generally agreed that postmodernity and post-secularity are strongly 
connected. Modernity and the secular have been correlated since the founding of 
sociology as a discipline, therefore, to go beyond the modern is to go beyond the secular. 
Phillip Gorski and et al point out,  
In one reading, postmodernism claims that modernity is over and hence we live in 
a postmodern era; in another view, postmodernism insists that the universalistic 
claims associated with modernity can no longer be sustained without demurral. 
And so it goes with the post-secular.208 
 
Post-modernity hails the end of modernity, as the post-secular hails the end of the secular. 
Postmodernism rejects universalistic claims of secular scientific rationality that presents 
itself as objectivity. Likewise, the post-secular rejects the universalistic claims associated 
with the secularization process that presents itself as inevitable.  
It must be insisted that the “return of religion” does not mean the “end of the 
secular.” This interpretation of the “end of the secular” often comes from religious actors 
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who desire that there in fact be within a normative sense the end of the secular, and that 
with the end of the secular that there would also be a hoped for triumphant return of 
religion. Kristina Stoeckl consider this desired and expected return of the sacred by the 
religious as a kind of “regime change” that is spoken of in terms of a historical transition 
of “before and after”. Stoeckl points out that, “Post-secularity becomes, from their point 
of view, a kind of state of redemption or salvation, a return not of, but to religion.” 
Stoeckl, who has written works on Russian Orthodoxy and human rights, has observed 
that “Patriarch Kirill himself or Metropolitan Ilarion, define post-secular society in this 
sense. They assume that Western secular modernity has run its course, has exhausted 
itself, has, in fact, become “post-modern” and “post-secular”, and is now ready to return 
to religion.“209 This sense of the post-secular understood as normativity and as a “regime 
change” can also be seen in the work of the founder of the Catholic magazine First 
Things, Fr. Richard John Neuhaus. In 1982, he wrote in his article, “Educational 
Diversity in Post-Secular America” (1982), that, “We are witnessing the collapse of the 
200 year old hegemony of the secular Enlightenment over public discourse.” This 
statement became the basis of Fr. Neuhaus’s agenda for the reinsertion of religion, not 
least the Catholic religion, into the public square, and the interjection of religious 
morality into the center of social values. Despite the necessary correction of the once 
prevalent and triumphalist classical secularization theory, this macro-narrative of the 
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contemporary “resurgence” is problematized by its tendency of proclaiming the opposite 
of the triumph of the sacred by the religiously devoted. But such a triumph cannot be 
proclaimed uncritically, for secularization still remains a potent transformative force 
within the process of globalization.   
The various models of the post-secular in regards to how the secular and the 
religious inter-relate within the public square are manifold. The most famous models are 
spoken of as the consensus model, that of accommodation and mutual translation, which 
is founded upon the Habermasian framework. Post-secularity is a via media of self-
reflexivity between strict atheism and religious fundamentalism. One can see this typical 
position within the work of social theorist Paul Vermeer, who writes:   
Postsecularity, then, is a middle position. Unlike the nonsecularist position, it 
views religion as a discursive phenomenon which, for instance, accepts plurality 
or acknowledges basic human rights; unlike the secularist position, it stresses the 
important contribution religion can make to civil society.210  
 
Indeed, Paul Vermeer finds “that Europe is at the same time secular, nonsecular and 
postsecular.” Europe contains the various positions scattered throughout its multiple 
societies. But it is the secularist position that is winning out.  
In sum, there are various ways of interpreting the post-secular that relate directly 
to the concept of the secularization thesis. And there are various models of interpreting 
the relation between the religious and the secular within the global public square, the 
most popular and paradigmatic consisting of Habermas accommodation/translation 
model. However, Olivier Roy’s model begs to differ, for it is the “tension model” that 
                                                        
210 Paul Vermeer, “Europe: Secular or Post-Secular?” Journal of Empirical Theology 22, 
no. 2 (2009):  222-24. 
  
 122
best describes Roy’s position on the debates. European University Institute affiliate and 
political scientist Kristina Stoeckl defines the post-secular as  
a condition of conscious contemporarily/co-existence of religious and secular 
worldviews. The co-existence of religious and secular worldviews, of religious 
and secular outlooks on society and politics, of religious and secular modes of 
understanding one's individual life creates tensions. Postsecularity is a condition 
of permanent tension.211   
 
Permanent tension within the public square is the outcome of deculturated religion. 
Deculturation obliterates the middle position and via media, the Sonderweg which is the 
premier Habermasian model of the post-secular.  
Jurgen Habermas and the Post-Secular 
It was Jurgen Habermas who popularized the concept of the post-secular in his article 
“Notes on a Post-Secular Society”. 212  Habermas addresses the growing religious 
pluralism of western societies and that is engendering a crisis of secularism and the 
secular-self consciousness. Habermas writes in his “Notes on a Post-Secular Society” that 
“Today, in public consciousness in Europe can be described in terms of a ‘post-secular 
society’ to the extent that at present it still has to ‘adjust itself to the continued existence 
of religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment”.  Habermas stands 
within the secularist tradition, in that Habermas argues that to raise the notion of the post-
secular, we must first assume that there must have been a secular in the first place. The 
post-secular therefore is a term that is specific to the modernized, post-industrial, and 
highly affluent societies within the West. The global south has never reached the levels of 
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modernity achieved in the West, therefore they are still in the process of secularization. 
Habermas is searching for what he calls the Sonderweg, another third way or via media 
that emerges from the dialectic between the sacred and the secular.  
There are, according to Habermas, “three overlapping phenomena” that “converge 
to create the impression of a worldwide ‘resurgence of religion’: the missionary 
expansion (a), a fundamentalist radicalization (b), and the political instrumentalisation of 
the potential for violence in many of the world religions (c).” And it is only the kinds of 
religion that Olivier Roy speaks of, that of deculturated religion, that Habermas observes 
as the paradigmatic example of the notion of the ‘return of religion’. As Habermas writes, 
the “most dynamic of all are the decentralized networks of Islam (particularly in sub-
saharan Africa) and the Evangelicals (particularly in Latin America). They stand out for 
an ecstatic form of religiosity inspired by charismatic leaders.” It is these ecstatic forms 
of religion that elicit a response of the “change in consciousness” within secular cohorts, 
the move towards self-reflexivity.  
Habermas theorizes his Sonderweg within the framework of a multi-culturalist 
model. And it is the multi-culturalist model that underpins the post-secular debate. As 
Habermas writes, “the universalist project of the political Enlightenment by no means 
contradicts the particularist sensibilities of a correctly conceived multiculturalism.”  Out 
of this multi-cultural model, the debate on tolerance finds its legitimation. As Habermas 
points out that,  
Tolerance means that believers of one faith, of a different faith and non-believers 
must mutually concede one another the right to those convictions, practices and 
ways of living that they themselves reject. This concession must be supported by 
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a shared basis of mutual recognition from which repugnant dissonances can be 
overcome.213 
 
This mutual concession of Habermas is that of mutually received translation between the 
dialoging cohorts: “if all is to go well both sides, each from its own viewpoint, must 
accept an interpretation of the relation between faith and knowledge that enables them to 
live together in a self-reflective manner.”  Faith must be translated into the language of 
secular reason so that non-religious cohorts can have access to the rationale of the 
religious motives and actions. Habermas assumes that the theological language of the 
religious is essentially irrational. Habermas is therefore an icon of the Enlightenment 
project. 
 Mariano Barbato and Friedrich Kratochwil point out that  
the significance of Habermas’s work becomes evident when attempting to utilize 
the semantic potential of religion for politics in the global sphere against the 
vacuum created by the collapse of the traditional political utopias. He wants to 
counteract the destructive tendencies of fundamentalism – and the visceral 
reactions it engenders – and at the same time to provide a counterweight to those 
developments that are likely to degenerate into an economistic dystopia of 
unfettered accumulation and its social pathologies.214 
 
Habermas is aware that secular utopias have failed. We are left in the wake of these 
utopias the meta-narrative of consumerism within the moral order of the immanent frame. 
All that remains within the enclosed box of the immanent frame after the collapse of 
utopias is the self-reference of the cult of the individual. Consumerism fills the vacuum 
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left with the void of mobilizing political ideologies that were contained in fascism, 
communism and nationalism. The unfettered fall of fertility within the affluent post-
industrial is a symptom of the social pathologies and economic dystopia that has beset the 
West. Habermas was prescient in pointing out the predicament of the combination of 
highly religious communities and fundamentalist radicalization within the backdrop of 
Europe. But Habermas is still too wedded to the Enlightenment project. Habermas 
assumes that religion is inherently irrational, which is the secular bias that William 
Cavanaugh critiques with his The Myth of Religious Violence, arguing that by 
constructing religion as irrational and therefore violent, the modern secular nation-state is 
able to justify its own sanctioned violence as rational. Secondly, Habermas, in much the 
same manner as Samuel Huntington, assumes that religion and culture are inherently 
linked and stand together within an organic relational whole. The assumption that 
religion and culture are one is the rationale of ‘multi-culturalism’, which is the logic that 
underpins much post-discourse. Yet, as Roy has shown, religion is now deculturated. 
Religion and culture have parted ways, and thereby multi-culturalism cannot operate as 
an effective mechanism within pluralized, secularized societies. 
Conclusion: The Failure of the Post-Secular 
The post-secular is to fundamentally recognize and come to terms with this resurgence of 
religion through a critique of the ‘secular’, in order to thereby constitute a deepening 
global consciousness, legitimacy and empathetic awareness of burgeoning diverse 
religious communities and their public acts of faith. The post-secular model can be 
described as a reflexive adjustment in secular self-understanding, or what Habermas calls 
a “change in secular self-consciousness” towards the religious other in shared societies, 
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which is a change that is characteristically marked by offering a middle position or via 
media between religious and non-religious cohorts. This via media is a political and 
philosophical openness that attempts to achieve “overlapping consensus” and obtain 
‘complementarity learning’ through mutual dialogue amongst and between religious 
communities and religious institutions with their non-religious correspondents. Theorists 
of post-secularity point out that the return and revival of religion repudiates the idea of 
the inevitable universal triumph of secularism, while still recognizing the flourishing of 
secular cohorts and possibilities of further developments of secularization.  
Yet what does religion mean in a secular and post-Christian West? In analyzing 
contemporary religion in Western societies, the ReligioWest project led by Olivier Roy 
assumes as factual basis that “European societies are highly secularized” and that 
secularization inhabits all its levels: legal, constitutional, cultural, and perhaps most 
crucially, sociological (a.k.a. “the decline of religious practice”). There has been 
discussion about whether or not there is a secular (i.e. ‘the myth of the secular’ by 
Rodney Stark and Roger Finke), and there is also ample discourse on the meaning or 
definition of the ‘secular’ for the sake conceptual clarity (as captured in the analytical 
distinctions of ‘secular, secularity, secularization’ by Jose Casanova). Foy Olivier Roy 
and his project of ReligioWest, the final conclusion is that “Secularism has won.”215  
The post-secular model proposes the idea of “overlapping consensus”, 
“translation”, “complementary learning”, or “reasonable accommodations” between 
religious and secular cohorts. Undergirding this concept is multiculturalism (whereby 
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various religious and non-religious cultures sit equally at a round table to dialogue and 
learn from each other’s way) and the notion of a common anthropology (which assumes 
the ‘humanity’ and ‘dignity’ of cosmopolitan human rights, natural law or rationality), 
through which religious and non-religious cohorts reasonably dialogue to convince one 
another of the value and correctness of their worldview. Olivier Roy’s analysis of the 
failure of the post-secular consists of at least two observations. The first is that 
multiculturalism is a failed project, and the second is that religious believers and secular 
adherents no longer share a common anthropology in which to frame a mutual discussion. 
On the failure of multiculturalism, Roy proposes in Holy Ignorance, that religion 
and culture have parted ways. Dialogue between the believer and nonbeliever is based on 
the multicultural paradigm, which presumes the inherent, internal, and stable link 
between a religion and its culture. This link between culture and religion has been 
severed due to globalization, secularization, and individualization. Religion can no longer 
be reduced to culture because of the irreducibility of the absolute of religious faith. 
Because there is no longer a natural link between a religion and its culture, a dialogue 
predicated on the multi-cultural model is bound to cause more confusion than 
clarification because the language of the religionist stands above, against, and outside the 
cultural reference. Religions are becoming less a matter of thick ethnic cultural and 
civilizational history, and are transforming along the lines of personalized choices and 
individualized religiosities: think of the Charismatic church growth in central China made 
possible by missionaries from Michigan, or of young British and German Christian 
converts to ISIS.  
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This deculturation fragments any sacred collective canopy into myriad petit 
sacred canopies, and thereby any common anthropological basis within a shared society 
becomes increasingly uncommon to each other. There is no longer a bond or collective 
identity that ties the believer and the non-believer together towards an ultimate referent in 
Western societies. Kristina Stoeckl, proposes that in a post-secular order, the religious 
and the non-religious share no common dialogical ground because both have radically 
different starting points on anthropology. Once upon a time we referred to God or the 
sacred cosmological order as an ultimate referent; this shifted to nationalism in the 
eighteenth century, and now we are left with the human rights of the mere individual as 
the sole referent of sacral basis. This chasm between rival anthropologies has been 
exacerbated since the 1960’s sexual revolution, and is made quite clear with the abortion 
debate: one version of anthropology argues for the sacred human personhood of a human 
embryo in utereo while another anthropology argues for a moral human personhood 
status bequeathed on the human embryo after birth. Though both religious and non-
religious individuals find “faith” in these competing anthropologies, it is evident that the 
twain shall never meet.  
The failure of the post-secular resides in the conceptualization and meaning of 
religion with a post-Christian and secular Europe. The problem is that “the deep conflict 
that is dividing Europe between a secular majority and hardcore religious faith 
communities on abortion, same-sex marriage, bio-ethics, or gender issues shows that 
there is no longer a common moral ground for values”. For Roy and the Religiowest 
project, Obergefell v. Hodges in the United States was the definitive end of the cultural 
war with the legalization of same-sex marriage. There is no longer a “continuity between 
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Christianity and modern secularism” that is undergirded with common values. The 
traditional position in Europe consisted of a “historically constructed mix of compromise 
and consensus that has shaped the relations between state, society and religion in Western 
countries since the end of religion.”216  Because of deculturated religion, this is no longer 
the case. Religion in the public sphere must therefore be rethought. 
It is at the base of the anthropological foundation in which we see change. What 
we see is an exclusive humanist anthropology based on reason versus a sacred 
anthropology based on revelation. The middle zone is being obliterated. With 
deculturation, what we see is that “in every religion, there is a growing split between a 
hard core of believers (mostly conservative or born-again) and secularized nominal 
members of the denomination.”217 Faith communities become stricter with their 
requirements of belonging. In the Catholic Church, people attend mass that suits their 
taste when it comes to the kind of Catholicism, whether traditionalist or liberalized or 
charismatic. Religions link together along the lines of shared religiosity, whether 
fundamentalist or liberalized. 
The Great Divide between religion and politics since the Enlightenment, spoken 
of by the humanist Mark Lilla, was concentrated on the political power of Church and 
State. The conflict today no longer involves political power, but rather it is one of values, 
norms and faith versus culture. After the separation of religion and state, we have the 
separation of faith and culture. This separation creates alienation within the religious 
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communities of faith. The religious communities are specifically set up against those of 
the exclusive humanist bent, which “stress the absolute freedom of the human being”. 
With the separation between religion and culture, we then have the separation between 
anthropologies. As Roy writes, “The grey zone and bridges between believers and non-
believers are disappearing.”218  
The post-secular should be in understood in terms of competing pluralization. 
Increasing religious diversity in secularized Western societies will result in increasing 
conflict between opposing values, because many of these religious communities will not 
shape up to ‘moderate’ forms of religion—religions that appear nice within the mirror of 
the post-secular imagination. Yet, within a post-secular model, up to what point can the 
liberal state make accommodation for the religious who do not tow the line towards the 
moderation of political liberalism? The future of political liberalism is on trial.  
The relationship between religion and society has changed so that the presence of 
religion has taken on a more vivid color. The dark backdrop of secularization has grown 
so sable that pure white paint drops of religiosity sparkle ever more bright. Religion, 
according to Roy, “refuses to be reduced to one symbolic system among others.”219   The 
stubborn persistence of religion consists of the fact that there understanding of religion 
does not fit easily with sociological scientific norms and taxonomic forms of 
classification. Those who are religious refuse to be explained away in terms of mere 
alienation. The break between religion and culture consists of the fact that the religious 
have a kind of language and understanding of reality that does not accept the rules of the 
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game from a secularist, immanent frame. Therefore, Roy concludes that, “We should 
avoid dissolving religion into cultures or traditions, especially at a time when 
globalization tends to autonomize religions from their respective cultural bedrocks. We 
should not approach religion through a lense of multi-culturalism…220 
The appropriate model of the post-secular is one that consists of permanent 
tension. Fundamentalism, as proposed by Roy, will always stand against this apparatus of 
the immanent frame, and against framework of political liberalism, which is in a state of 
crisis. The growing fundamentalism that we are witnessing is a trait of the growing 
secularization of culture. More secularization means more radicalization of the sacred. 
When asking the question about the apparent rise of fundamentalism, we need to also ask 
it concomitant question of the rise of secularization. The more a society or culture 
secularizes, the more the religious stand out, stand alone, and appear odd, exotic and as a 
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Chapter 5: Political Theology and the Post-Secular 
Olivier Roy writes that “Secularization does not mean the end of transcendence but the 
establishment of a nontheological transcendence, in a sense of a secularized religion.”221   
What is the connection of Olivier Roy’s work to political theology? And does this lead to 
the avenue of cosmopolitan theory? The purpose of this chapter is not to look at 
cosmopolitanism as a whole distinct body of literature with all of the possible trajectories 
involved, rather, I am linking political theology as a discourse to Roy’s theory of 
deculturation of religion, and lay a few possible implications with the cosmopolitan, or 
what can be called the cosmopolitical.  
There are several theo-political aspects within Roy’s theories of globalization and 
religion. They are to be found within the separation of religion and culture, and with the 
separation between revelation and reason. For Roy, when religion parts from culture, 
revelation parts from reason. The break consists further within anthropology, in which 
because of deculturation “there is no longer a natural law common to believers and non-
believers.”222 Because of the refusal of the religious to have their faith reduced to a 
symbolic system, and because of their emphasis on the absoluteness of faith, there is a 
fundamental chasm developing between the de-culturated forms of religiosity
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that differs qualitatively from the secularized anthropologies that governs modern 
political discourse.  
The question of political theology is to observe the interplay between the political 
and the theological, and the sacred and the secular, and to ask how they mutually 
transform each other. Political theology is the analysis of secularization through locating 
sacred dimensions and structures within the secular sphere of the political, and of 
observing in history the transference of the sacred to the secular political-social sphere as 
it takes shape in practice and beliefs.  The question of secularization, religion and 
globalization within the work of Olivier Roy brings out the final question of the political, 
metaphysical and epistemological authority that separates the secularized non-believers 
and the religious faithful.  
Roy posits that deculturated religion consists of those who refuse to have their 
religion subsumed under the paradigm of ‘culture’. Deculturated religion consists of the 
true believers, the ‘born-again’ believers, including the so-called fundamentalists, who 
believe in a transcendent, irreducible absolute of revealed faith, one that resists the 
Habermasian model of mutual accommodation and translation within a post-secular 
public space. Secularization has created the decline of religious authority by locating all 
authority within the locus of the right of the individual, and thereby perpetuating de-
traditonalized and pluralized interpretations of sacred texts, which is followed by the 
varieties of the governing behaviors and norms that constitute the religious communities. 
Because of such, secularization has transformed religion into a decentralized force, and 
thereby has furthered the chasm between the believer and the non-believer. The 
transforming globalizing and secularizing forces thereby engenders the so-called ‘return 
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of religion’ as primarily a reaction. The link between cosmopolitan theory and the 
counter-cosmopolitan is that of the globalized and deculturated transnational religious 
bodies that are developing with the aid of technological advances, and who thereby link 
as faith communities that are universal in their scope, absolute in their theo-political 
foundation, and deterritorialised within their global aspirations.   
Through globalization, these deculturated forms of religiosity link together based 
on their mutually shared beliefs on how they interpret what is revealed in their sacred 
texts and required by religious faith. Some of these forms of religiosity aim for social 
justice and align alongside mainstream norms, as we see with some evangelical 
movements such as the International Justice Mission. These communities function 
positively within the sphere of global civil society insofar as they align with the agenda 
of human rights within secularized, liberal democracies. Those of the fundamentalist 
versions of modernity however, resist the global civil society and the attempt of 
sociologists, anthropologists and other mainstream models of political discourse to be 
reduced into culture and within an ethical framework of human rights. Through paradox, 
the same technological instruments of globalization are used to communicate the 
religious message of the fundamentalists in order to oppose their encroachment. Osama 
Bin Laden, in his rejection of the westernizing and globalizing forces, appropriated the 
technologies and materials created by those same forces. Bin Laden was the creation of 
globalization, but also played the role of its destruction through the explosion of the Twin 
Towers. It is what Jacques Derrida points to with the ‘autoimmunity’ of globalized 
religion, a self-destruction inherent within the structure of globalization, the seed that 
contains its own implosion. No one is outside the scope of the consequences of 
  
 135
globalization. We are thoroughly globalized, no matter our religious or secular 
disposition.  
The divide between the nontheological transcendence of secularity and the 
religious faith of deculturated religiosity has the theo-political aspect of the universal 
against the particularistic, of the condition against the unconditioned, of revelation 
against reason. The question of the post-secular, of how to account for pluralization, of 
the self-reflexive critique of the secular, of the attempt to adjudicate between competing 
norms, is at bottom a theo-political question. The post-secular is a political theological 
endeavor. It is a question of normative conflict and tensions. It is in final analysis the 
classic question asked by the Latin Church Father Tertullian, ‘What does Jerusalem have 
to do with Athens?’. Politics and religion, the secular and the sacred are unable to be 
completely separated, but they are also unable to be completely conflated. What follows 
is a brief account of the definition and trajectory of political theology, and its relation to 
the post-secular, globalization and the theory of deculturated religion of Olivier Roy.  
The Secularization and Sacralization of Politics 
There is no one singular definition of political theology that explains it 
comprehensively. Political theology is a comprehensive and expansive concept that 
transforms with the political and theological questions of our times. For instance, in 
defining the term “political theology”, continental philosopher of religion Creston Davis 
writes that, “It is true that the subject of political theology resists singular definition; 
indeed the term functions like a nebulous concept—a Rorschach test whose ink markings 
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are given meaning by the individual perceiver taking the exam.”223 As with the definition 
of the concepts “religion” and the “secular”, there are as many possible definitions as 
there are methodological approaches to the subject at hand. Plurality is inevitably the 
name of the game. It is therefore appropriate to first raise the notion of plural political 
theologies in conjunction with the notion of political theology in the singular, for the 
social reality of globalized, Western secularized societies is that of pluralism and 
pluralization. Political theology was once upon a time a product of Christian discourse. 
Today it is now a cross-religion competitive sport between the major world religions and 
non-believers alike, inclusive of all comprehensive doctrine, whether sacred or secular. 
 Jacob Taubes has pointed out that theology is a problem of political theory.224 
Theology has been joined to the political from the onset. The term “theology” was coined 
in Western history within the context of the crisis of the Greek city-states, first appearing 
in Plato’s The Republic, which is a Socratic dialogue regarding the concept of justice, the 
just individual and the city-state. Plato criticizes the Greek discourse and symbols of 
theology, myth, and poetry for their distortion of the true nature of the divine, and for 
their corruption of the education of the youth. In Plato’s quest for the ideal republic, 
Taubes observes that, “the issue of theology was for Plato intrinsically related to political 
theory”.  The actual conjoined term of “political-theology” originates in ancient Rome. 
Jewish philosopher David Ohana points out that, “‘political theology’ is an old concept 
                                                        
223Creston Davis, “Editorial Introduction: Political Theology—The Continental Shift”, 
Political Theology, Vol. 11.1 2010, 5-14, 5. 
 
224 See Jacob Taubes, “Theology and Political Theory”, in Social Research, Vol. 22, No. 
1 (Spring 1955), 57 
  
 137
which made its appearance with Marcus Terentius Varro (116-27 BCE)…”225 Varro 
outlines the concept of political theology in his Antiquities, a document that is no longer 
extant, but which is referred to in the manuscripts of Tertullian’s Ad Nationes and of 
Augustine’s De Civitas Dei. Varro’s concept of political theology referred to the priests 
of the public civil religion of Rome. After Tertullian’s and Augustine’s repudiation of 
Roman pagan political theology, the term submerges in history only to reappear with 
Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise, a work that was influenced with the political 
psychology of Hobbes and the philosophical theology of Maimonides. For political 
philosopher Leo Strauss, the core issue of Spinoza’s Treatise was about the conflict 
between revelation and philosophy. As Leo Strauss writes:  
The chief aim of the Treatise is to refute claims which had been raised on behalf 
of revelation throughout the ages; and Spinoza succeeded, at least to the extent 
that his book has become the classic document of the “rationalist” or “secularist” 
attack on the belief in revelation.226  
 
After Spinoza, the term “political theology” does not reemerge until Carl Schmitt, 
who famously defined “political theology” and set forth the anxiety of influence from 
henceforth. As Schmitt wrote:  
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in which 
they are transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby for example, 
the omnipotent God became the omnipotent law giver—but also because of their 
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systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological 
consideration of these steps.227  
 
It is with Schmitt’s definition that I can highlight certain methodological aspects of 
political theology: that of 1) historical development and/or genealogy, and that of 2) a 
sociological consideration which analyzes the systematic and homologous structure of 
concepts between the political and theological found in societal development.  
To explain political theology as a theoretical method, one can say that the method 
consists of observing and historically analyzing the transference of what is the sacred 
towards the secular political sphere, or what political theologian William Cavanaugh calls 
the “Migration of the Holy”, a term that he borrows from the historian John Bossy. What 
Cavanaugh means by the “Migration of the Holy” is that “the kinds of public devotion 
formerly associated with Christianity in the West never did go away, but largely migrated 
to a new realm defined by the nation-state.”228 Hence, the political sphere becomes its 
own form of an ersatz, secularized religion after the collapse of Western Christendom. 
This thesis of the “Migration of the Holy” echoes the thought of Olivier Roy as he writes, 
“Secularization does not mean the end of transcendence but the establishment of a 
nontheological transcendence, in a sense of a secularized religion.”229 This “secularized 
religion” would be the loyalty and ultimate commitment to the nation-state as the sole 
guarantor of ethics or to the natural sciences as the sole form of epistemology.  
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Political theology is therefore defined as the analysis of secularization through 
locating sacred dimensions and structures within the secular sphere of the political, and of 
observing in history the transference of the sacred to the secular political-social sphere as 
it takes shape in practice and beliefs. The modern, secular nation-state has adopted itself 
into the sovereign, or that of infinite value.  
Yale legal theorist Paul Kahn writes in reference to the vast devastation of nuclear 
warfare unleashed during WWII, “How is that the political order that understands itself as 
characterized by the rule of law can hold forth the possibility of such destruction?”230 To 
which William Cavanaugh responds with his observation of the transference that 
occurred from the sacred into the secular: “It can only be because the nation has taken on 
an infinite value, and the popular sovereign, or nation as god, must retain its exceptional 
powers to act.”231 The transference of the dimension of the sacred to the secular political 
sphere is covert, hidden, secret, denied and not openly acknowledged. Yet the sacred is 
uncovered and evidenced within the civic religious language of “sacrifice” (dying for 
one’s country), “pledge of allegiance” to the symbolic flag, and ultimate commitment and 
loyalty to nation-state above any other institution; and in these homologous resonances 
one notices the homologous functional structure between the liturgy of the church and the 
liturgy of the state. For instance, Kahn has argued in his Political Theology: Four New 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (2011) that the American political imaginary is 
linked to the theo-political through the sacrificial violence on behalf of our American 
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Constitution, which is a text that is sacred and inviolable, and is a text that is set against 
the historical backdrop of the American Revolution, which was a great act of sacrificial 
violence for the purpose of freedom and sovereignty.  
Further elsewhere, Kahn points out “the political formation of the experience of 
the sacred is the subject of political theology”.232 Kahn has argued that political theology 
is a descriptive phenomenological method used to “identify and describe the presence of 
the sacred, wherever it appears.”233 Such a method can “pierce the [modern liberal] 
state’s self-presentation as an efficient means of justly advancing individual welfare and 
look to the experience of the political,” which at its core is imbued with the “mysterium 
tremendum of the sacred, with its tremendous power for both destruction and 
construction…”. In the end, “the state creates and makes its own sacred space and 
history”234 Kahn insists that political theology ought to analyze where the state has 
created the sacred through secularized theological concepts, and where the state  
continues to support an actual theological dimension in our political practices. 
Political theology as a form of inquiry is compelling only to the degree that it helps 
recognize that our political practices remain embedded in forms of belief and practice 
that touch upon the sacred.235  
 
The self-reflexive criticism of the secular consciousness has opened the gate for political 
theological reflection within post-secular discourse. In the post-secular context, British 
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theologian Graham Ward argues that the rise of political theology in conjunction with the 
public visibility of religion has to do with the end of the post-modern era. Post-modernity 
was linked to the rise of global neo-liberal capitalism and the uncoupling of currency 
from the gold standard, creating a consumerist world of virtual simulacra that 
characterized the post-modern, the era of the sensuous Alice in Wonder-Disney Land. 
Continental philosopher of religion Clayton Crockett argues along the same lines, as he 
writes: “I argue that the resurgence of determinate forms of religiosity today represents a 
crisis of modern liberal capitalism.”236 It is within this context of the post-secular where 
the emergence of political-religious identity and the assertion for equality and discourse 
via religious legitimation in the public sphere has risen sharply. Crockett says further, “In 
a post-secularist environment, we possess no absolute or certain criterion by which to 
claim that any phenomenon is theological as opposed to nontheological.”237 This loss of 
the criterion to determine and finalize theological interpretation is the result of the decline 
of religious authority due to secularization. In the end Crockett finds the post-secular to 
be a corollary to the post-modern, since modern and the secular are intrinsic to each 
other’s identity. In the era of the post-secular, secular political philosophy cannot be 
fully, rigorously, strictly, and absolutely divided, bifurcated, and separated from political 
theology. Politics is sacralized, and the sacred is politicized. 
 Lastly, Cecile Laborde, a professor of political theory at the University College of 
London, argues that political theology is a discourse that is critical of secular liberal 
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political theory, and she gives us three theses. Laborde writes, “Political theology denies 
that politics and religion are, or can be mutually autonomous. This challenge, however, 
can take three distinct forms—what I call three theses of political theology.”238 Laborde’s 
three thesis are each a different model on the relation between the theological and the 
political: 
• “Thesis 1. All states, even secular states, define shape and control religion”239 
• “Thesis 2. Religious groups make theological claims on the state”240 
• “Thesis 3. There is no essential distinction between the political and the 
theological”241 
Thesis 1 bears on the fact that the state has the power to define what counts as 
religion and what doesn’t, and does so for the sake of power; Thesis 2 is the opposite of 
the first thesis in that it concerns theocracy, where religion undermines the secular order, 
such as seen radical political Islamist or Protestant fundamentalism; Lastly, Thesis 3 
regards what Laborde calls “the most radical thesis of political theology”242, which 
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“denies the autonomy of the political altogether”243, whereby “As Benhabib recounts, the 
basic categories of the political are structurally the same as the theological.”244 
Olivier Roy and Political Theology 
As I have shown, the concept of political theology has multiple interpretations and 
possibilities. In the final analysis, politics and religion, the secular and the sacred are 
unable to be completely separated, but they are also unable to be completely conflated. 
That is what defines political theology and creates its importance. At its most broadest 
sense, political theology refers to what political scientist Carlo Invernizzi Accetti defines 
simply as “the attempt to ground political legitimacy on a transcendent source.”245 
Though this overlooks many other questions of ethics, culture and so forth, it captures the 
important crux to the debate, which is that of authority, legitimacy and power in the 
political sphere. And this is what Olivier Roy observes, that the nontheological 
transcendence that governs the immanent frame is itself a form of secularized religion. At 
the foundational level this is an issue of either a secular or sacred anthropology. How one 
interprets the nexus between the cosmos, the divine, and the human is the driving divide 
that we see occurring in the post-secular and post-Christian West. The Great Divide, as 
Mark Lilla puts it, which is that of the divide between religion and politics, has brought 
us to the current social reality of the separation between religion and culture.  
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There are several general connections to be made between Olivier Roy and 
political theology. Using Cecil Laborde’s ‘Three Theses of Political Theology’, which 
gives a succinct summation of what constitutes political theology, we can make three 
correlations. The first of the thesis is that of: “All states, even secular states, define shape 
and control religion”246 This thesis directly correlates with Olivier Roy’s notion of 
‘formatting’ or standardization of the definition and conception of religion, a 
standardization that “occurs in the name of human rights, religious freedom and 
multiculturalism.”247 The secular state defines, manages, and thereby re-configures 
religion through the courts. The assumption for the secular state, as is with Habermas, is 
that religion and theology is essentially irrational. The second thesis consists that of 
“Religious groups make theological claims on the state”248.  This precisely what Olivier 
Roy points out in the failure of political-religious societies his The Failure of Political 
Islam, in that a religious faith community can never constitute itself as a true political 
society, because of the nature of religious belief. The religious refuse to bow to any other 
symbolic order, and the non-religious return the favor. According to Roy, “A society is 
based on sovereignty, starting with the appropriation of a territory. A society is first of all 
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political, never religious, even if it calls on religion to legitimize power relations.”249 In 
addition, the nature of religious faith requires a purity of belief and an exclusion of those 
who fail to adhere, a strict system that is bound to fail within a political society. 
Secularization forces religion to construct itself as mere religion, or purely religious. As 
Roy writes,  
The tension between politics and religion cannot be resolved by establishing a 
‘religious’ political system. In order to endure, a society cannot rely solely on the 
explicit, but must build itself on the implicit and the unspoken, even if there is a 
consensus on the core values. It must accept and not diminish its marginal 
elements, deviances and otherneses—from brothel to carnival, from 
homosexuality to drug or alcohol use.250 
 
Marginality, deviation, and the other are all rejected through deculturated religion, which 
bases itself entirely on exclusion and purity and a strict religiosity. Lastly, as we see with 
third thesis from Cecil Laborde, that “There is no essential distinction between the 
political and the theological”251 Roy makes a strong case that a religious-political system 
cannot exist due to the nature of religious faith and the nature of the political. On one 
hand for Roy, “attempts to politicize religion in this way always ends up secularizing it” 
252 and on the other hand, Roy writes that “Secularization does not mean the end of 
transcendence but the establishment of a nontheological transcendence, in a sense of a 
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secularized religion.”253 It is here that we see that Roy observes the structural relation 
between the sacred and the secular and the issue of transcendent authority, which are all 
decisive characteristics of political theology.  
“I am human, therefore nothing human is alien to me”, wrote the ancient Latin 
author Terence. But the question fails in the age of globalized, deculturated religion, 
when the very nature of what it means to be human and the fundamental anthropological 
differences between the sacred and the secular have emerged. The question of 
globalization brings us to the imperative of cosmopolitanism, for globalization simply 
does not operate on the material level but is also about the ‘subjective plane of human 
conscious’ and the creating of the human, and therefore global imaginary. Derrida wrote 
in his On Cosmopolitanism that cosmopolitan it is a “theoretical task indissociable from 
its political implications”.254 
  
The cosmopolitan is of the conviction that it is the ‘oneness of humanity’ that 
transcends the political limitations and defining borders, and that out of this oneness 
lends the subsequent and necessary conviction of our responsibility towards one another. 
Hegel wrote that it is of “infinite importance” that “a human being counts as such 
because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, 
Italian, etc.”255 The interface between the global and the local can be witnessed within the 
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global civil society, which is largely a component of cosmopolitanism. It is also seen in 
the transnational, for cosmopolitanism seeks to get beyond state sovereignty. It realizes, 
as Robert Fine points out, “that some of the worst violators of human rights can be states 
or state like formation.”256 Derrida echoes this sentiment and notes that, “All Nation-
States are born and found themselves in violence. I believe that truth to be irrecusable.”257 
Within the major social transformations being effected through globalization, there is 
now a necessity to move our categories beyond the dated Westphalian model, and to take 
notice that there is a need “for a corresponding change in social theory—one which takes 
the world and not the nation-state as its primary unit of analysis.”258  
The theo-political aspect of globalization can be summed up with Manfred’s 
Steger’s observation on of globalization: “the building of a truly democratic and 
egalitarian global order that protects universal human rights without destroying the 
cultural diversity that is the lifeblood of human evolution.”259 Globalization creates the 
possible condition for the cosmopolitan. The cosmopolitan can potentially be a 
differentiated universal, not a covert ‘european universalism’, not yet another masked 
version of the ‘occidental imaginary’, but a truly global vision, or as put by Immanuel 
Wallerstein a “universal universalism”, that  
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refuses essentialist characterizations of social reality, historicizes both the 
universal and the particular, reunifies the so-called scientific and humanistic into a 
single epistemology, and permits us to look with a highly clinical and quite 
skeptical eye at all justifications for ‘intervention’ by the powerful against the 
weak.260  
 
It would be a place of global polycentric diversality, “a multiplicity of universalisms that 
would resemble a network of universalisms.”261  
The separation of the political sphere in which we call ‘secular’, from the 
apolitical sphere which we call ‘religion’, is a construct of the European imaginary that 
separates the irrational, the absolute and the divisive inherent aspect of ‘religion’ from the 
rational, tolerant and unifying inherent aspect of what we call the ‘secular’. The Great 
Divide was thus first in the beginning a political move. For Mark Lilla this is a 
tendentious and fragile experiment or achievement that is open to further revision and 
perhaps even failure. Crisis and failure mark our globalized age. At bottom, the concern 
for the new forms of public religious visibility and ‘communicative action’ in the public 
square is because of globalized religious violence and terrorism of radicalized religious 
sects. The rejection of the liberalized norms of sexuality (abortion, gay marriage, etc.) the 
wearing of headscarfs and veils, and the high fertility rates of the religious all come 
together as symbols that give an apparent sense of a great awakening or spiritual revival 
within the heartlands of the West. But as Roy has pointed out, this is not the case. 
Secularism engenders and transforms religion, and not the other way around. Roy’s 
critique is that contra Samuel Huntington, we are not witnessing a clash of culture or a 
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clash civilizations. Globalization has uprooted the territorial concept of ‘civilization’. 
Globalization is the end of civilizational theory, and multi-culturalism, as it is the 
creation of globalized cosmo-political. Instead of a clash of civilizations, we are seeing a 
clash of religiosities, and a clash of anthropologies. We are witnessing a competition 
between a deculturated religiosity and a sacred anthropology that is based on a revelation 
that refuses to be subsumed under the heading of ‘culture’ on one hand, and between an 
exclusive humanist secular anthropology that is based on scientific, instrumental reason 
or rationality on the other hand. 
In works such as Emilio Gentile’s Politics as Religion (2006) an in John Gray’s 
Black Mass (2007), one breaks the binary of whether religion controls politics or whether 
politics controls religion by positing that politics is the new religion. This insight arises in 
an age where the boundary between what is religious-apolitical and secular-political is 
porous, permeable, fluid, transitory, transforming, whether linear, cyclical or however 
else. Hybridization and creolization is the watermark of globalization, which is the 
extension of the hypermodern. Political theology is the recognition of this permeability, 
and that at bottom there is no essential difference between the secular political sphere and 
religion, even though there may be many differences in exterior and accidentals. Political 
theology is, as is echoed in the writings of Catholic political theologian Johann Baptist 
Metz, a hermeneutics that reinterprets the religious ideas, existential yearnings, human 
desires and mankind’s hope that is found in the secularized narrative of the political. In 
the secular-political one finds the theological written in palimpsest. And if the world 
finds itself re-enchanted and resurgent with religion, this may mean that the world has 
simply lost its love for its god of the nation-state, and has become harlot to other gods. 
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The return of religion, which does not exist in a form of the return of civilizational 
religion, but rather consists within the self-reflexive doubt of the post-secular conscience 
that recognizes the malleability and tendentious nature of a materialist ontology and the 
supposed scientific neutrality of a naked empirical reason. This self-reflexive nature of 
the post-secular consciousness runs up against the religious exception of the absolute, the 
irrecusable transcendent and universal, the singularity. The subtraction story that Charles 
Taylor posits, whereby all that is left after the husk of religion is peeled away is the 
kernel nature, is in the final analysis a ‘story’, an imagined construction or mythos. If 
there is a crisis in religion, this is because there is a crisis in secularism, and by extension, 
liberal democracy. If I may reverse Taube’s thesis of “in the beginning theology emerged 
as a problem of political theory”, I would say that in the end political theory emerged as a 






Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
Globalization theory best describes the dominant trends for our emerging religious future, 
the new forms of contemporary religions and religiosities, their future trajectories, their 
global trends, and their varieties of transformation within the Western public sphere. 
Globalization has created the conditions necessary for the return of religion, but 
paradoxically has secularized the religious at the same time. The unintended consequence 
of secularization is that by creating an autonomous sphere for religion, a road was paved 
for the 21st century resurgence and revitalization of religion. Globalization and 
secularization has separated religion from culture, creating ‘deculturated religion’, which 
is at the heart and root of both fundamentalist and liberalized religion.  
The public visibility of religion consists of the fact that the alternative expressions 
of religion, whether fundamentalist or secularized, is a symptom of secularization insofar 
as it manifests the de-institutionalization of religion and the decline of religious authority 
through the individualization of religious beliefs. Reflexive modernity, characterized by 
an individualization that privatizes the absolute sovereignty of the individual's choice and 
values, intersects with the varieties of deterritorialised religions that operate within a 
globalized spiritual marketplace, making the optionality of religion freely available to all. 
The re-configuration of the religious through secularization is characterized with 
individual choice and optionality.  
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This choice and optionality are signified through fertility rates and conversions. 
The religious are choosing to have more children as a sign of the repudiation of the 
surrounding, hostile secular culture, and in order to fulfill the mandates and spiritual 
demands of their religious faith. The non-religious are choosing not to have children 
because of post-material values and the demands of the here hic et nunc. Yet both the 
religious and non-religious are centered on individualized choice. Shall the religious 
inherit the earth through fertility rates and fecundity? Olivier Roy thesis of deculturation 
contradicts this possibility, because deculturated religion lacks the inherit ability to 
transmit religion to the next generation. Deculturated religion is fundamentally a “born-
again” experience that requires an individual faith commitment towards the norms and 
codes of that religion, and such a faith cannot be passed down, as it requires each 
individual to decide his or her own religious identity. Modern religiosity consists of 
personal conversion, that of the born-again experience. And as of such, the demographic 
thesis of the reversal of religion through birth rates is rendered problematic, as the 
children of religious parents will be thrown into pluralized western societies where the 
tendency is to disaffiliate or liberalize within the secular milieu of the immanent frame.  
Roy finds that conversions are an indicator of the so-called return of religion and 
deculturated religion, and globalization is a driving force behind religious conversions. 
Globalization secularizes, but at the same time it creates religious revival. Globalization, 
taken as overarching concept that embraces the totality of Western modernization in all 
of its forms—the political, the economic, and the cultural—is a main driver in causing 
religious disaffiliation and religious conversion in the West. Yet, the extreme poverty 
levels in the global south and non-western societies created by globalized, neoliberal 
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capitalism serve as a main driver of high levels of religiosity. High levels of global mass 
immigration from non-Western societies into Europe and other Westernized societies 
creates the uptick of an apparent return of religion, which in the secular public sphere 
appears vibrant due to their commitment towards religious practices and expressions high 
levels of religiosity. In this sense, globalization is a main driver of secularization in the 
West, and the main driver of religiosity within the south. Globalization is a duel edged 
sword. 
Through the process of deculturation, the post-secular is rendered problematic 
because there is no longer a middle ground between religious and secular cohorts in 
which a common consensus can emerge within the public square. The post-secular 
consists of the condition of an uncertain, enduring tension rather than accommodation. 
Deculturation de-traditionalizes and de-contextualizes religion, transforming religion into 
religiosities that are either fundamentalized or liberalized, and that are based on 
incommensurable anthropologies. These emerging religiosities refuse to be reduced to 
culture or to any other symbolic system, and because of such, the debates on religion in 
the public square are radicalized by both the religious and non-religious. There is no 
longer a common ground between secular and sacred values that can offer theoretical 
moral framework to achieve a consensus between religious and non-religious values. 
Because religion no longer belongs to culture, multi-culturalism is a failed project, and it 
is multi-culturalism that often undergirds the post-secular debate. Olivier Roy finds that 
in the end, secularization has won the debate within the West. The post-secular is a myth.  
Political theology is to observe the interplay between the political and the 
theological, and the sacred and the secular, and to ask how they mutually transform each 
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other. The question of secularization, religion and globalization within the oeuvre of 
Olivier Roy brings out the final question of the political, metaphysical and 
epistemological authority between non-believers and believers. There are several theo-
political aspects within Roy’s theories of globalization and religion. They are to be found 
within the separation of religion and culture, and with the separation between revelation 
and reason, and with the fundamental anthropological rift that is occurring between 
exclusive humanism and the “born-again” believers of the religion in question. The link 
between cosmopolitan theory and the counter-cosmopolitan is that of the globalized and 
deculturated transnational religious bodies that are developing with aid of technological 
advances, who link as faith communities that are universal in their scope, absolute in their 
theo-political foundation, and deterritorialised within their global aspirations. Graham 
Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton wrote that, “Political theology reflects and feeds on a 
crisis in religion, whether that crisis is understood historically (as Reformation) or 
existentially (as doubt, skepticism or boredom).”262  The crisis in contemporary religion 
is its return in new forms of de-culturated religiosity and public visibility, whether 
fundamentalism or pagan. The loss of centralized religious authority due to secularization 
has created pluralities of religious interpretation that spin either towards radicalized 
forms or liberalized forms of religiosity. 
Holy Ignorance indicates religious fundamentalism’s ignorance of its own 
cultural and theological traditions, and it also indicates the secular west ignorance of its 
own cultural religious heritage. Roy’ use of the term ignorance does not intend insult, but 
                                                        
262 Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton, ed., with a postscript by Etienne Balibar, 




rather means ignorance in its most literal sense, that of the lack knowledge. Knowledge 
of theological tradition is no longer required for the salvation for the religious believer, 
and knowledge of the religious heritage of Europe from its secular societies has been 
forgotten, in what French sociologist Danielle Hervieu-Leger calls “amnesiac societies”. 
Holy Ignorance is therefore ignorance on both ends of the spectrum, the ignorance that 
proceeds from the religious, and the ignorance that proceeds from the secular. 
Deculturation perpetuates Ignorance, whether holy or unholy, whether sacred or profane, 
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